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Tort Liability, Religious Entities, and the
Decline of Constitutional Protection
SCOT C. IDLEMAN"
The First Amendment prohibits the adjudication of legal actions that directly or
derivatively require the resolution of religious questions, such as disputes over
theological doctrine, scriptural interpretation, or ecclesiastical law. Among the most
visible cases implicating this principle are tort suits against religious institutions and
clergy, often stemming from the latter's alleged misconduct towards congregants or
children. At present, the majority judicial position appears to be that most such tort
actions are, in fact, barred by the First Amendment. This Article shall argue that this
adjudicatoryprohibition, at least in the tort context, will likelybe functionally eroded
if not formally eliminated in the coming decades.
Several reasons, taken together, suggest the principle's demise. Not only has tort
litigation against religions entities increased in recent years, thus generating more
challenges to the principle, but this increase has been accompanied by the public's
growing sympathy for the victims of clergy exploitation, by a waning societal
appreciation for institutional religion, and by an undervaluation of the First
Amendment concerns at stake. Moreover, because such suits are generally brought
in state court rather than federal court, these public attitudes may be less constrained
and the judges may be less sensitive to broader constitutional limitations. Finally,
even where courts are sensitive to these limitations, the constitutional framework,
such as it is today, may no longer provide support for the principle of
nonadjudication as applied to tort cases. In addition to the principle's unsure footing
either in doctrine or in theory, as well as an apparent traditional disfavoritism
towards viewing religious liberty in institutional terms, recent years have also
witnessed a trend under both religion clauses towards formal neutrality and the idea
that religion should generally be treated as having no independent constitutional
significance.
The Article is divided into four parts. Part I will contend that the bar on certain
tort actions is actually an application of a more general prohibition on the
adjudication of religious questions and will examine the contours of this prohibition
and its specific application in the tort context. Part II will then explore various
reasons, such as those noted above, why the bar on adjudicating certain tort actions
may increasingly be limited or eroded with time. Part I will examine the doctrinal
means by which the principle's erosion may be effected, while Part IV will examine
various factors that may forestall this erosion.
* Assistant Professor, Marquette University Law School. Many thanks to Professor
Eugene Volokh, to the participants in the Symposium atwhichthisArticle was presented, and
especially to the Symposium's organizer, Professor Daniel Conkle.
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I. THE GENERAL PROHIBITION ON ADJUDICATING
RELIGIOUS QUESTIONS
A. Its Nature and Manifestations
If asked to envision a violation of the First Amendment religion clauses, one is
likely to focus on the outward actions of the government that affect or involve
religious individuals or institutions-the distribution of funds to religious schools,
for example, or the criminalization ofpeyote use, or the restrictive zoning of church
property.I But the religion clauses also contain a more abstract restriction on the
capacity of government, and especially the judiciary, to involve itself in matters of
religious truth and doctrine, potentially irrespective of the conduct at issue and the
identities ofthe parties. Broadly conceptualized, this restriction amounts to a general
prohibition on the adjudication of religious questions, not unlike the Article HI
prohibition on the adjudication of so-called political or nonjusticiable questions.2
1. The First Amendment religion clauses consist of the Establishment Clause, which
provides that "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion," and the
Free Exercise Clause, which provides that "Congress shall make no law... prohibiting the
free exercise [of religion] .... U.S. CONST. amend. I. Although mine have noted that it is
mistaken to view these guarantees as two separate "clauses," see Mary Ann Glendon & Raul
F. Yanes, Structural Free Exercise, 90 MIcH. L. REv. 477, 478 n.8 (1991); Richard John
Neuhaus, A New Order ofReligious Freedom, 60 GEO. WASIL L. REv. 620, 627 (1992), this
Article shall adopt the conventional usage, however erroneous, and treat them as such.
2. Although "the Supreme Court never has dismissed a case as nonjusticiable on the
grounds that the issue was religious in nature," Lawrence C. Marshall, Comment, The
Religion Clauses and Compelled Religious Divorces: A Study in Marital and Constitutional
Separations, 80 Nw. U. L. REv. 204, 250 n.221 (1985), several other courts as well as
scholars have employed the concept of nonjusticiability to characterize religious questions.
See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AmRIcAN CoNsTrrTUToNAL LAW § 14-11, at 1236 (2d ed. 1988)
(describing religious questions as "non-justiciable"); Frederick Mark Gedicks, Toward a
Constitutional Jurisprudence of Religious Group Rights, 1989 Wis. L. REV. 99, 132 (noting
that "[t]he Court has developed a religion clause analogue to the political question doctrine"
that applies when the resolution of litigation "depends upon interpretation of religious
doctrine" but "no such interpretationis forthcoming," inwhich case "the Court generally must
abstain from adjudicating the case rather than rendering the interpretation itself, because
theological and ecclesiastical questions are notjusticiable"); Marjorie Heins, "OtherPeople's
Faiths ": The Scientology Litigation and the Justiciability of Religious Fraud, 9 HASTINGS
CONST. L.Q. 153 (1981); Stephen Senn, The Prosecution ofReligious Fraud, 17 FLA. ST. U.
L. RaV. 325, 337 (1990) (describing the "issue of religious verity" as "nonjusticiable");
Matthew S. Steffey, Redefining the Modem Constraints of the Establishment Clause:
Separable Principles of Equality, Subsidy, Endorsement, and Church Autonomy, 75 MARQ.
L. REv. 903, 905 (1992) (noting that "the Court has forbiddenjudicial resolution of questions
concerning a church's creed, governance, or discipline" and concluding that "[s]uch issues
are, in effect, nonjusticiable"); Bernard Roberts, Note, The Common Law Sovereignty of
Religious Lawfinders and the Free Exercise Clause, 101 YALE L.J. 211, 226-28 (1991)
(proposing that "[p]erhaps the model of a 'religious question doctrine,' analogous to one
version of the political question doctrine, will help to illuminate the civil courts' habit of
refraining from inquiry into matters of religious law"); infra note 23; cf. Ira C. Lupu, The
Trouble withAccommodation, 60 GEo. WAsH.L. REv. 743,759-62 (1992) (assessingwhether
[Vol. 75:219
DECLINE OF CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTION
This general prohibition manifests itself in at least three lines of cases. Under the
first, it has long been recognized that the government, including a court or a jury,
may not inquire into the validity of a religious assertion or belief. Whether couched
in terms of "truth or falsity,"'3 "reasonableness, ' 4 'verity,"5 "correctness,"6 or
"worthiness,"7 the essential idea is that the government is categorically barred from
scrutinizing religious beliefs or claims with respect to some measure of objective
validity.' In the words of one court, "it is not for us to approve or disapprove of the
church's beliefs."9 Under the second line of cases, the government is forbidden from
undertaking the independent interpretation of religious texts or tenets, at least in a
manner that will yield an authoritative declaration or determination as to their
meaning.'0 Accordingly, it has been stated that "[c]ourts are not arbiters of scriptural
free exercise accommodation claims can or should be conceptualized as nonjusticiable).
3. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 407 (1963) (reaffirming "the prohibition against
judicial inquiry into the truth or falsity of religious beliefs"); Williams v. Bright, 658
N.Y.S.2d 910, 914 (N.Y. App. Div.) ("American courts have no business endorsing or
condemning the truth or falsity of anyone's religious beliefs."), appeal dismissed, 686N.E.2d
1368 (N.Y. 1997).
4. Callahan v. Woods, 658 F.2d 679, 685 (9th Cir. 1981) ("In applying the free exercise
clause of the First Amendment, courts may not inquire into the truth, validity, or
reasonableness of a claimant's religious beliefs."); Estate of Supple v. Roman Catholic
Archbishop, 55 Cal. Rptr. 542, 545 (Cal. Ct App. 1966) (equating challenge to "the
reasonableness of [one's religious] beliefs" with a challenge to "the truth or scientific validity
of such beliefs").
5. United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 86 (1944) (holding that "the truth or verity" of
a party's religious claims, even if disputed by another party, may not be submitted to the
jury); Philbrook v. Ansonia Bd. of Educ., 757 F.2d 476, 481 (2d Cir. 1985) (contrasting
"sincerity," which is a permissible object of inquiry, with "verity," which is not), aff'd, 479
U.S. 60 (1986).
6. Smith by Smith v. Board ofEduc., 844 F.2d 90, 93 (2d Cir. 1988) ("Generally it is not
proper for courts to evaluate the truth or correctness of an individual's sincerely held religious
beliefs.").
7. Kaplan v. Hess, 694 F.2d 847, 851 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (citing Ballard and holding that
"the court may not inquire into the worthiness of appellants' religious beliefs to ascertain
whether they merit First Amendment protection").
8. See generally U-John v. Composite Bible-Based Religious Body of All Protestant &
Catholic Orgs. of Christendom & All Jewish Orgs. of Judaism, 839 F. Supp. 861, 862-64
(N.D. Ga. 1993) (refusing to adjudicate suit alleging that all Christian and Jewish entities
were in theological error); TRIBE, supra note 2, § 14-11, at 1231-32. In U-John, the plaintiff
("U-John") rathermodestly claimed to be "King Priest of the Universal Sovereign, My-John,"
id. at 862, as well as "'God's only begotten son' and 'King Priest of God's Governmentwith
human subjects throughout the entire earth."'Id. at 862 n.1 (quoting plaintiff's memorandum
of facts).
9. Meroni v. Holy Spirit Ass'n for Unification of World Christianity, 506 N.Y.S.2d 174,
176 (N.Y. App. Div. 1986).
10. See, e.g., Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 269 n.6 (1981) ("[11o inquire into the
significance ofwords and practices to different religious faiths, and in varying circumstances
by the same faith... would tend inevitably to entangle the State with religion in a manner
forbidden by our cases."); Callahan v. Woods, 658 F.2d 679, 686 (9th Cir. 1981) (noting that
courts must abstain "from evaluating the merits of a scriptural interpretation"); Havurah v.
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INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
interpretation,"" and that "[i]t is not the province of government officials or courts
to determine religious orthodoxy." 2 Third and lastly, under what is sometimes called
the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine, 3 the government may not inquire into or
review the internal decisionmaking or governance of religious entities, especially
those of a hierarchical nature. 4 In its formal rendition, "[tihe rule of judicial
Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 418 A.2d 82, 87 (Conn. 1979) ("What are the particular tenets of a
recognized religious group is not amatter for secular decision."); Baumgartner v. First Church
of Christ, 490 N.E.2d 1319, 1324, 1325 (Ill. Ct App. 1986) (holding that a claim which
"would require the court to extensively investigate and evaluate religious tenets and
doctrines" is "not a justiciable controversy" insofar as "the first amendment precludes such
an intrusive inquiry by the civil courts into religious matters"); Glass v. First United
Pentacostal Church of DeRidder, 676 So. 2d 724, 731 (La. Ct. App. 1996) ("[lit is without
question that the Court may not undertake to interpret the scriptures referenced within the
article in question concerning church discipline."); Hester v. Barnett, 723 S.W.2d 544, 559
(Mo. CL App. 1987) ("The free exercise clause forbids a court from any evaluation of the
'correctness' of the content of religious sermons as expressions of belief or religious
practice.").
11. Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707, 716 (1981). For a critical assessment of this
principle as invoked in Thomas, see Samuel J. Levine, Rethinking the Supreme Court's
Hands-OffApproach to Questions ofReligious Practice and Belief, 25 FoRDHAM URB. L.J.
85, 92-101 (1997).
12. Teterud v. Bums, 522 F.2d 357,360 (8th Cir. 1975); see also Daniel v. Waters, 515
F.2d 485, 491 (6th Cir. 1975) (invalidating under the Establishment Clause a Tennessee
statutory provision allowing the omission from public school textbooks of "occult or satanical
beliefs of human origin" because "[i]t would be utterly impossible for the Tennessee
Textbook Commission to determine which religious theories were "occult" or "satanical"
without seeking to resolve the theological arguments which have embroiled and frustrated
theologians through the ages"); Saunders-El v. Tsoulos, 1 F. Supp. 2d 845, 848 (N.D. Ill.
1998) (noting "the undesirability ofjudges donning religious robes over judicial ones" and
that "courts are not equipped to resolve intra-faith differences among followers of a particular
creed in relation to the Religion Clauses").
13. See, e.g., Paul v. Watchtower Bible & Tract Soc'y ofN.Y., Inc., 819 F.2d 875, 878 &
n.1 (9th Cir. 1987); Dobrota v. Free Serbian Orthodox Church, 952 P.2d 1190, 1194 (Ariz.
Ct. App. 1998); Barnes v. Outlaw, 937 P.2d 323, 326 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1996), vacated in part
on other grounds, 964 P.2d 484 (Ariz. 1998); O'Connor v. Diocese of Honolulu, 885 P.2d
361, 364 (Haw. 1994); Korean Presbyterian Church of Seattle Normalization Comm. v. Lee,
880 P.2d 565, 566 (Wash. Ct. App. 1994). For a critical overview of the doctrine, see Paul
J. Morken, Church Discipline and Civil Tort Claims: Should Ecclesiastical Tribunals Be
Immune?, 28 IDAHo L. REV. 93, 97-120 (1991-92).
14. See, e.g., Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595, 602 (1979).
[T]he First Amendment prohibits civil courts from resolving church property
disputes on the basis of religious doctrine and practice. As a corollary to this
commandment, the Amendment requires that civil courts defer to the resolution
of issues of religious doctrine or polity by the highest court of a hierarchical
church organization.
Id. (citations omitted); see also Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696,
709 (1976).
[W]here resolution of the disputes cannot be made without extensive inquiry by
civil courts into religious law and polity, the First and Fourteenth Amendments
mandate that civil courts shall not disturb the decisions of the highest
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deference is that civil courts are to do no more than determine the highest
ecclesiastical tribunal withjurisdiction over the dispute, ascertain the decision of the
tribunal, and defer to its resolution of the dispute."' 5
Most courts agree that each manifestation, and thus the general prohibition itself,
is ultimately rooted in the First Amendment. They disagree, however, on the
appropriate clause.' 6 Some ground the doctrines in the Free Exercise Clause or, more
ecclesiastical tribunal within a church of hierarchical polity, but must accept
such decisions as binding on them, in their application to the religious issues of
doctrine or polity before them.
Id.; see also Drevlow v. Lutheran Church, Mo. Synod, 991 F.2d 468, 471 (8th Cir. 1993)
("The Constitution forbids secular courts from deciding whether religious doctrine or
ecclesiastical law supports a particular decision made by church authorities."); Smith v.
O'Connell, 986 F. Supp. 73, 76 (D.R.I. 1997) ("It is well established that the First
Amendment prohibits secular courts from intervening in the internal affairs of hierarchical
churches by deciding what, essentially, are religious matters."); Maxwell v. Brougher, 222
P.2d 910, 911 (Cal. Ct App. 1950).
Where the subject matter of a dispute is purely ecclesiastical in its character, a
matter which concerns church discipline or the conformity of its members to the
standard of morals required of them, the decision of the church tribunal will not
be interfered with by the secular courts either by reviewing their acts or by
directing them to proceed in a certain manner or, in fact, to proceed at all.
Id.; see also Tran v. Fiorenza, 934 S.W.2d 740, 743 (Tex. App. 1996).
The civil courts will . . . not intrude into the church's governance of
"religious" or "ecclesiastical" matters, such as theological controversy, church
discipline, ecclesiastical government, or the conformity ofmembers to standards
of morality. Furthermore, "courts will not attempt to right wrongs related to the
hiring, firing, discipline or administration of clergy."
Id. (quoting Higgins v. Maher, 258 Cal. Rptr. 757, 757-58 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989)). See
generally Ira Mark Ellman, Drivenfrom the Tribunal: Judicial Resolution ofInternal Church
Disputes, 69 CAL. L. REv. 1378 (1981); Douglas Laycock, Towards a General Theory of the
Religion Clauses: The Case of Church Labor Relations and the Right to Church Autonomy,
81 COLuM. L. Rav. 1373, 1394-97 (1981); Levine, supra note 11, at 88-92; Louis J. Sirico,
Jr., Church Property Disputes: Churches as Secular andAlien Institutions, 55 FORDHAM L.
REv. 335 (1986); Steffey, supra note 2, at 949-53.
15. Carl H. Esbeck, A Restatement of the Supreme Court's Law of Religious Freedom:
Coherence, Conflict, or Chaos?, 70 NoTRE DAME L. REV. 581, 601 n.75 (1995); see also
Maktab Tarighe Oveyssi Shah Maghsoudi, Inc. v. Kianfar, 179 F.3d 1244, 1248 (9th Cir.
1999).
Under [the deference] approach [of Watson v. Jones], the court avoids
entanglement in religious issues by accepting the decision of the established
decision-making body of the religious organization.... When the nature of the
religious organization or the identity of its decision-making body is disputed on
the basis of religious doctrine ... the resolution of these threshold questions may
require a court to intrude impermissibly into religious doctrinal issues.
Id. (citations omitted); see, e.g., Decker ex rel. Decker v. Tschetter Hutterian Brethren, Inc.,
594 N.W.2d 357, 362-65 (S.D. 1999) (refusing to adjudicate various property, contract, and
tort issues related to schism and alleged wrongful excommunicative expulsion, instead
deferring to apparent church authority).
16. See Smith v. O'Connell, 986 F. Supp. 73, 80 (D.R.I. 1997) (noting that courts have
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generally, the concept of religious freedom;17 others opt for the Establishment
Clause; 8 still others look expressly to both clauses; 19 while a few courts refer the
grounded the doctrine in different aspects of the First Amendment, some using the
Establishment Clause while others using a principle of religious autonomy). This Article,
being largely descriptive and predictive, does not explicitly or systematically argue in favor
of a particular constitutional basis or mode of operation of the general prohibition (although
the concept ofnonjusticiability under the Establishment Clause strikes this author as the most
appropriate). Nor does this Article delineate a normative constitutional analysis for
determining the adjudicability of tort claims against religious entities, however necessary or
helpful such an analysis may be. The focus, rather, is simply on the likely dimensions and
disposition of the analyses actually employed by courts, taking into account various cultural,
institutional, and doctrinal considerations.
17. See, e.g., Amato v. Greenquist, 679 N.E.2d 446,450 (11. App. Ct. 1997).
Our courts have refused to entertain such claims because the first amendment's
free exercise clause prohibits courts from considering claims requiring the
interpretation of religious doctrine. To permit claims for clergy malpractice
would require courts to establish a standard of reasonable care for religious
practitioners practicing their respective faiths, which necessarily involves the
interpretation of doctrine.
Id.; see also Belin v. West, 864 S.W.2d 838, 841 (Ark. 1993).
[R]eligious freedom includes the power of religious bodies to determine for
themselves, free from state interference, matters of church government as well
as those of faith and doctrine. In short, it is impermissible for the civil courts to
substitute their own interpretation of the doctrine of a religious organization for
the interpretation of the religious organization.
Id.; see also Tran, 934 S.W.2d at 743 (noting that, in regard to various claims of tortious or
similar conduct, "[a]lthough such wrongs may exist and be severe, and although the
administration of the church may be inadequate to provide a remedy, the preservation of the
free exercise of religion is deemed so important a principle it overshadows the inequities
which may result from its liberal application").
18. See, e.g., United Christian Scientists v. Christian Science Bd. of Dirs., 829 F.2d 1152,
1167 (D.C. Cir. 1987) ("The Establishment Clause prohibits any and all official judgments
concerning the rectitude of religious belief."); Klagsbnm v. Va'ad Harabonim of Greater
Monsey, 53 F. Supp. 2d 732 (D.N.J. 1999) (holding that the Establishment Clause bars
various defamation claims); Doe v. Evans, 718 So. 2d 286, 288-93 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1998)
(applying Establishment Clause entanglement analysis to varioustort claims), review granted,
735 So. 2d 1284 (Fla. 1999).
19. See, e.g., Ayon v. Gourley, 47 F. Supp. 2d 1246, 1249 (D. Colo. 1998) (holding that
adjudicating various tort claims "would violate both the Free Exercise and Establishment
Clauses"), aff'd, 185 F.3d 873 (10thCir. 1999);Konklev. Henson, 672N.E.2d450,454 (Ind.
Ct. App. 1996) (citing principles and doctrines from both clauses, though primarily
proceeding under the Establishment Clause); Downs v. Roman CatholicArchbishop, 683 A2d
808,811 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1996) (interpreting the U.S. Supreme Court's cases andholding
that "under the First Amendment Establishment and Free Exercise clauses, civil courts have
no authority to second-guess ecclesiastical decisions made by hierarchical church bodies");
Black v. Snyder, 471 N.W.2d 715, 718-21 (Minn. Ct App. 1991) (analyzing contract, civil
rights, and defamation claims separately under each clause); Gibson v. Brewer, 952 S.W.2d
239,246-47 (Mo. 1997) (en bane) (discussing both "entanglement between church and state"
and free exercise); F.G. v. MacDonell, 696 A.2d 697,702-03 (N.J. 1997) (looking primarily
to the Free Exercise Clause but mixing in elements from Establishment Clause doctrine, e.g.,
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reader to the First Amendment as a whole.2" Most courts also agree that the general
prohibition, once triggered, normally precludes further adjudication of the issue in
question.2 They part ways, however, regarding the prohibition's precise legal
operation. The majority of courts broadly conceptualize it as a bar on jurisdiction;22
that civil court "entanglement could restrain the free exercise of religion"); Church of
Scientology v. Siegelman, 475 F. Supp. 950, 952-53 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (combining various
principles of each clause).
20. See, e.g., Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595, 602 (1979).
[T]he First Amendment prohibits civil courts from resolving church property
disputes on the basis of religious doctrine and practice. As a corollary to this
commandment, the Amendment requires that civil courts defer to the resolution
of issues of religious doctrine or polity by the highest court of a hierarchical
church organization.
Id. (citations omitted); see also Doe v. Hartz, 970 F. Supp. 1375,1429 n.42 (N.D. Iowa 1997)
(noting that the Eighth Circuit's cases refer to both clauses and that "[t]here appears to be
some uncertainty or a split in authority in other jurisdictions as to which clause of the First
Amendment is implicated by a claim againstreligious institutions or members ofthe clergy"),
rev'd in part andvacated in part on other grounds, 134 F.3d 1339 (8th Cir. 1998); Green v.
United Pentacostal Church Int'l, 899 S.W.2d 28,29 (Tex. App. 1995) (similar), cert. denied,
517 U.S. 1134 (1996); Carl H. Esbeck, The Establishment Clause as a StructuralRestraint
on Governmental Power, 84 IoWA L. REV. 1, 50 (1998) ("When abstaining from intrachurch
dispute cases, the Supreme Court references the First Amendment generally, not expressly
singling out either the Establishment Clause or Free Exercise Clause.").
21. In addition to adjudication, the prohibition may also circumscribe or preclude other
aspects of litigation. It may, for example, limit discovery. See, e.g., In re Pleasant Glade
Assembly of God, 991 S.W.2d 85, 90 (Tex. App. 1998) (holding that because "the
complained-of conduct is inexorably intertwined with [the defendant's] religious beliefs," and
would therefore "violate[ the First Amendment,... any discovery relating to these matters
would likewise be barred as irrelevant"), order stayed on other grounds, No. 2-98-222-CV,
1999 WL 13249 (Tex. Ct. App. Jan. 13,1999). See generally Jeffrey Hunter Moon, Protection
Against the Discovery orDisclosure of Church Documents and Records, 39 CATH. LAW. 27,
34-44 (1999). Likewise, itmay affect the admissibility of evidence. See, e.g., Davis v. Church
of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints, 852 P.2d 640, 646-49 (Mont. 1993) (affirming rulings
on motions in limine restricting the admission of evidence relating to certain Church practices
and doctrines). And, where adjudication does occur, it may limit remedies. See Bollard v.
California Province of Soc'y of Jesus, No. C 97-3006 SI 1998 WL 273011, at *3 (N.D. Cal.
May 15, 1998) (noting in a Title VII case, alleging wrongful constructive termination of
candidacy for priesthood, that the court "would certainly become entangled in the religious
realm if it were to address the extent to which plaintiff could be 'made whole' from loss of
a life of spiritual service or the proper compensation for the 'emotional pain' one suffers from
this deprivation" and that "[t]he prospect ofpunitive damages, designed to change defendants'
conduct of Formation [of priests], would also involve the Court in an unconstitutional
intrusion into the relationship between the Society of Jesus and its clergy"); cf. Tilton v.
Marshall, 925 S.W.2d 672, 680 (Tex. 1996) (disallowing compensation for the plaintiffs'
"allegedly unanswered prayers").
22. See, e.g., Bell v. Presbyterian Church (U.S.A.), 126 F.3d 328, 330-33 (4th Cir. 1997)
(affirming dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under the First Amendment);
Klagsbrun, 53 F. Supp. 2d at 732 (dismissing for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under the
Establishment Clause); Belin, 864 S.W.2d at 841-42; The Bible Way Church of Our Lord
Jesus Christ of the Apostolic Faith v. Beards, 680 A.2d 419, 427 (D.C. 1996) (addressing it
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others employ the more specialized concept of nonjusticiability.23 Still others
describe their task in terms of abstention24 or in terms of applying an evidentiary
rule.25 Periodically, a court will even analyze the matter directly under the balancing
as "a potential First Amendment bar to the trial court's subject matter jurisdiction"), cert.
denied, 520 U.S. 1155 (1997); Brazauskas v. Fort Wayne-S. Bend Diocese, Inc., 714 N.E.2d
253, 262 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999) (holding that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction
over a defamation claim against religious defendants because its adjudication would have
entailed "an impermissible scrutiny of religious doctrine"); Downs, 683 A.2d at 811-13;
Buchanan v. Second Tabernacle Missionary Baptist Church, No. 70063, 1996 WL 417135,
at *1 (Ohio Ct. App. July 25, 1996); Green, 899 S.W.2d at 29-31; see also Young v. Northern
Ill. Conf. of United Methodist Church, 21 F.3d 184, 185-88 (7th Cir.) (holding that the First
Amendment precluded subject matter jurisdiction over a Title VII suit challenging church
hiring procedures), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 929 (1994).
23. See, e.g., Najafi v. INS, 104 F.3d 943, 949 (7th Cir. 1997) ("Determination of a
religious faith by a tribunal is fraught with complexity as true belief is not readily
justiciable."); Nayak v. MCA, Inc., 911 F.2d 1082,1083 (5th Cir. 1990) ("The plaintiffasked
the court to decide the 'correct' interpretation of the life of Christ. This is not a justiciable
question before a federal court."), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1087 (1991); Stansfield v. Starkey,
269 Cal. Rptr. 337, 345 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990) ("[T]he threat that if one left the church one's
relatives 'would be damned in Hell forever' implicates religious beliefs and is not
justiciable." (citation omitted) (quoting Molko v. Holy Spirit Ass'n, 762 P.2d 46, 64 (Cal.
1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1084 (1989)); Baumgartner v. First Church of Christ, Scientist,
490 N.E.2d 1319, 1326 (Ill. Ct. App.) ("Whether or not defendants negligently or
intentionally applied church doctrine is not ajusticiable controversy."), cert. denied, 479 U.S.
915 (1986).
24. This is certainly the case where a court claims that it is invoking the "Ecclesiastical
Abstention Doctrine." See supra note 13. Even outside that specific context, one can find
references to the concept of abstention. See, e.g., Callahan v. Woods, 658 F.2d 679, 686 (9th
Cir. 1981) (describing Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707 (1981), as an "abstention from
evaluating the merits of a scriptural interpretation"). In some instances, of course, abstention
may simply be another means of indicating a lack ofjurisdiction. See Esbeck, supra note 20,
at 42-43.
25. The most common use of an evidentiary approach occurs in the judicial handling of
intrachurch disputes. For example, in Kedroffv. St. Nicholas Cathedral, 344 U.S. 94 (1952),
the Court held that "'the decisions of the proper church tribunals on matters purely
ecclesiastical.., are accepted.., before the secular courts as conclusive,"' id. at 116 n.23
(quoting Gonzalez v. Roman Catholic Archbishop, 280 U.S. 1, 16-17 (1929)); see also Jones
v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595, 611-20 (1979) (Powell, J., dissenting) (characterizing the operation
of the neutral principles approach in evidentiary terms, indeed calling it an "evidentiary
rule"). Several state courts have followed suit. See, e.g., Sinai Memorial Chapel v. Dudler,
282 Cal. Rptr. 263, 268 (Cal. CL App. 1991) ("[1]n the absence of fraud or collusion, the
interpretation of Jewish law by an accredited body ... is accepted in litigation before the
secular courts as conclusive, even if the decision affects the civil rights of appellant and even
if the decision is 'arbitrary."'); Fire Baptized Holiness Church v. Greater Fuller Tabernacle
Fire Baptized Holiness Church, 475 S.E.2d 767,771 (S.C. Ct. App. 1996) (per curiam) ("This
court must accept the National Church's interpretation of the requirements of its Discipline
as conclusive."). This third doctrine is particularly evidentiary-like insofar as the Supreme
Court and several lower courts recognize exceptions, such as fraud or collusion, that can rebut
the presumption of conclusiveness. See infra text accompanying note 138.
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scheme of the Free Exercise Clause,26 although the propriety of this method is
uncertain in the wake of Employment Division v. Smith.'
B. Its Application to Tort Cases
In theory, the general prohibition can be triggered by virtually any controversy in
which a religious question happens to be implicated. 8 For a variety of reasons,
26. See, e.g., Snyder v. Evangelical Orthodox Church, 264 Cal. Rptr. 640, 645 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1989) (analyzing adjudicability of various tort claims under a free exercise compelling
interest analysis). "[Mf government action-here, in the form of tort liability-burdens
religious conduct, the importance of the state's interest must be weighed against the severity
of the concomitant burden on religion." Id.; see also, e.g., Davis, 852 P.2d at 649 (holding,
as part of a strict scrutiny analysis, that the plaintiff s "tort claim is not a right ofthe highest
order not otherwise served so as to overbalance the Church's claim to the free exercise of
religion").
27.494 U.S. 872 (1990) (limiting significantly the applicability ofheightened scrutiny in
free exercise cases). Compare Smith v. O'Connell, 986 F. Supp. 73, 77-80 (D.R.I. 1997)
(applying free exercise analysis to tort suit against religious entity, equating the "neutral
principles of law" approach with "neutral laws of general application" addressed in Smith),
and Ayon v. Gourley, 47 F. Supp. 2d 1246, 1248-49 (D. Colo. 1998) (similarly conflating
these categories and specifically discussing "Smith's neutral principles exception," although
concluding that "general tort liability theories... do not fit the description of 'valid and
neutral law[s] of general applicability"' in Smith because while "[tihe law at issue in Smith
was a straightforward prohibition on the possession of certain specified controlled
substances," claims of "outrageous conduct and negligent hiring and/or supervision. . . ,by
definition, require muchmore subjective judgment on the appropriateness ofthe conduct than
the across-the-board prohibition inSmith"), af'd, 185 F.3d 873 (10th Cir. 1999), with Combs
v. Central Tex. Annual Conf. of the United Methodist Church, 173 F.3d 343, 349 (5th Cir.
1999) (recognizing a "distinction betweenthe two strands of free exercise cases-restrictions
on an individual's actions that are based on religious beliefs and encroachments on the ability
of a church to manage its internal affairs"--and holding, with regard to the judicially crafted
ministerial exception under Title VII, that the "fundamental right of churches to be free from
government interference in their internal management and administration has not been
affected by the Supreme Court's decision in Smith and the demise of Sherbert"), EEOC v.
Catholic Univ. of Am., 83 F.3d 455, 461-63 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (holding that the ministerial
exception under Title VII survived the diminishment of free exercise protection effected by
Smith), EEOC v. Roman Catholic Diocese, 48 F. Supp. 2d 505, 511-13 (E.D.N.C. 1999)
(holding that "Smith did not overrule the ministerial exception"), and Lee Boothby, Religious
Freedom in the United States Following City ofBoerne v. Flores, 2 NExus 111, 117-18 (Fall
1997) (arguing that "Smith in no way encroaches upon the long line of church automony
cases").
28. See TRIBE, supra note 2, § 14-11, at 1236 (noting that "the [F]irst [A]mendment has
been construed to mean that religious questions remain non-justiciable even when they do not
reach civil courts independently but instead form preliminary or ancillary issues in an
otherwise justiciable dispute"); Steffey, supra note 2, at 947 (observing that "the application
ofany legal standard-including constitutional standards-canturn onareligious question").
By the same token, the mere fact that a dispute involves a religious entity, its representatives,
or its property does not render the dispute nonjusticiable. "While the First Amendment
prohibits excessive entanglement with religion, it by no means prohibits courts from any
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however, it regularly arises in tort actions against religious entities, typically as one
of many First Amendment concerns. In such cases, in fact, the most apparent
constitutional concern is often iot one of the general prohibitionper se but rather of
the potential abridgement of church autonomy (although the third component of the
general prohibition, the so-called ecclesiastical abstention doctrine, arguably reflects
both the principle of church autonomy and the principle of not adjudicating religious
questions). The concern, in particular, is that judicial assessment and regulation of
church or clergy decisionmaking could constitute undue interference with the
internal governance of religions institutions, either because they themselves possess
free exercise rights or because their members, by voluntary association, possess such
rights collectively. To determine, for example, that a church negligently installed or
transferred a particular pastor is effectively to override the church's prior decision
in this regard and to dictate the church's or its congregation's decisionmaking in the
future. Yet, as many courts have recognized, decisions relating to clergy hiring or
transfer may amount to important and often irreducibly religious practices or
expressions of faith and doctrine.29 Thus, even apart from the issue of religious
involvement in religious disputes. The Establishment Clause merely prohibits courts from
determining underlying questions of religious doctrine and practice." Klagsbrun v. Va'ad
Harabonim of Greater Monsey, 53 F. Supp. 2d 732, 737 (D.N.J. 1999).
29. See, e.g., Kaufinann v. Sheehan, 707 F.2d 355, 358-59 (8th Cir. 1983).
While there may be some secular aspects to employment and conceivably even
to the priesthood or clergy, it is apparent that the priest or other member of the
clergy occupies a particularly sensitive role in any church organization.
Significant responsibility in matters of the faith and direct contactwith members
of the church body with respect to matters of the faith and exercise of religion
characterize such positions.
Id.; see also McClure v. SalvationArmy, 460 F.2d 553,558-59 (5th Cir.) ("The relationship
between an organized church and its ministers is its lifeblood .... Matters touching this
relationship must necessarily be recognized as of prime ecclesiastical concern. Just as the
initial function of selecting a minister is a matter of church administration and government,
so are the functions which accompany such a selection."), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 896 (1972);
Roman Catholic Diocese, 48 F. Supp. 2d at 515 (applying McClure and Rayburn v. General
Conf. ofSeventh-DayAdventists, 772 F.2d 1164 (4th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 478 U.S. 1020
(1986), to a case of alleged discriminatory and retaliatory reassignments of a lay music
minister and concluding that "[t]he government's intrusion into a church's employment
decision regarding the individual who is to be a minister by'shar[ing her] faith, serv[ing] the
community, and express[ing] the love of God and neighbor through music,' is no doubt an
excessive entanglement when the government advocates instituting policies, practices and
procedures for an ecclesiastical body") (alteration in original); Dean v. Alford, 994 S.W.2d
392, 395 (Tex. App. 1999).
[T]he issue of a pastor's ouster is ecclesiastical in nature. Courts may not
attempt to right wrongs related to the hiring, firing, discipline, or administration
of clergy. While such wrongs may exist and be severe, and although the
administration of the church may be inadequate to provide a remedy, the
preservation of the free exercise of religion is deemed so important a principle
it overshadows the inequities which may result from its liberal application.
Id. (citation omitted); see also Howard v. Covenant Apostolic Church, Inc., 705 N.E.2d 385,
388 (Ohio Ct. App. 1997) (notingthat "matters regarding 'who should preach from the pulpit'
are fundamentally and unquestionably beyond the jurisdiction of secular courts"), appeal not
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questions, the decisionmaking of religious entities may be immunized from certain
tort actions simply as a matter of church autonomy, although the additional presence
of religious questions could, of course, dramatically strengthen the case against
adjudication.30
A second concern, and one more likely to implicate the general prohibition, is that
such a determination might further require the court to scrutinize the reasoning or
doctrine underlying the church's conduct. Where that reasoning or doctrine is
religious in nature, however, doing so may create excessive entanglement of
government and religion." The danger, specifically, is that of doctrinal
entanglement, which is one of several types of entanglement restricted by the
Establishment Clause.32 So, for example, if the issue of clergy placement implicates
allowed, 688 N.E.2d 1043 (Ohio 1998); Gibsonv. Brewer, 952 S.W.2d 239, 247 (Mo. 1997).
[J]udicial inquiry into hiring, ordaining, and retaining clergy would result in an
endorsement of religion, by approving one model for church hiring, ordination,
and retention of clergy. A church's freedom to select clergy is protected "as a
part of the free exercise of religion against state interference." Ordination of a
priest is a "quintessentially religious" matter, "whose resolution the First
Amendment commits exclusively to the highest ecclesiastical tribunals of this
hierarchical church."
Id. (citations omitted) (quoting Kedroff, 344 U.S. at 116, and Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese
v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696, 719 (1976), respectively).
30. See, e.g., Drevlow v. Lutheran Church, Mo. Synod, 991 F.2d 468, 471 (8th Cir. 1993)
("The First Amendment proscribes intervention by secular courts into many employment
decisions made by religious organizations based on religious doctrine or beliefs. Personnel
decisions are protected from civil court interference where review by civil courts would
require the courts to interpret and apply religious doctrine or ecclesiastical law."). Although
infringement of church autonomyhas been expressed here as apotential Establishment Clause
problem, especially in terms of entanglement, such infringement can also be analyzed, and
perhaps more easily so, under the Free Exercise Clause. See generally Laycock, supra note
14, at 1388-98. This is especially true where the entanglement is less doctrinal and more
administrative or regulatory. But cf James D. Gordon III & W. Cole Durham, Jr., Toward
Diverse Diversity: The Legal Legitimacy ofEx Corde Ecclesiae, 25 J.C. &U.L. 697, 703-04
(1999) (noting that Laycock's "analysis was developed.., in a pre-Smith world, when the
Free Exercise Clause was understood to have some bite against neutral regulatory burdens
imposed on religious institutions" and that, today, grounding the autonomy doctrine in the
Establishment Clause may prove more advantageous) (footnote omitted).
31. See, e.g., Gibson, 952 S.W.2d at 246-47 ("Questions of hiring, ordaining, and
retaining clergy ... necessarily involve interpretation of religious doctrine, policy, and
administration. Such excessive entanglement between church and state has the effect of
inhibiting religion, in violation of the First Amendment."); see also Drevlow, 991 F.2d at 471
("The Constitution forbids secular courts from deciding whether religious doctrine or
ecclesiastical law supports a particular decision made by church authorities."); Klagsbrun,
53 F. Supp. 2d at 742 ("[l]nquiry into the methodology of how religious organizations arrive
at their conclusions concerning questions of religious doctrine are, like the conclusions
themselves, beyond the ken of civil courts.").
32. See TRiBE, supra note 2, § 14-11, at 1226-32 (presenting atypology of administrative,
vesting, political, regulatory, and doctrinal entanglement); Robert A. Destro, Developments
in Liability Theories andDefenses, 37 CAT. LAW. 83, 96-97 (1997) ("There are three basic
types of entanglement... 1) administrative entanglement, such as oversight of church or
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not only the church's decisions but also the canon law underlying those decisions,
then the issue cannot be fully addressed by a court-or any arm of civil
government-insofar as its resolution would essentially require the court itself to
expound and apply the canon law. 3 So likewise would the restriction applyto matters
involving Jewish law where the government is asked to make determinations or
resolve disputes necessitating its interpretation. 4 Such matters, turning as they do on
church-school use of state moneys .... 2) doctrinal entanglement, such as utilizing courts to
decide matters of doctrine,. . . and 3) political entanglement, such as excessive church
involvement in political affairs."); Note, Government Noninvolvement with Religious
Institutions, 59 TEx. L. REV. 921,935-39 (1981 ) (explaining the distinctionbetweendoctrinal
and administrative entanglement, and elaborating on the former).
33. See, e.g., Isely v. Capuchin Province, 880 F. Supp. 1138, 1150 (E.D. Mich. 1995) ('It
is well-settled that when a court is required to interpret Canon Law or internal church policies
and practices, the FirstAmendment is violated because such judicial inquiry would constitute
excessive government entanglement with religion."); Barnes v. Outlaw, 937 P.2d 323, 326
(Ariz. Ct. App. 1996) ("The doctrine of ecclesiastical abstention prohibits courts from
determining issues of canon law."), vacated in part on other grounds, 964 P.2d 484 (Ariz.
1998); Ross v. Ross, No. FA 970162587S, 1998 WL 516159, at *11 (Conn. Super. Ct. Aug.
10, 1998) ("The court finds that if the parties' claims are held valid, in such future cases a
Superior Court must apply and interpret religious laws and rules.... This case is a request
to examine the internal workings of Episcopal Church canon law. This court will not apply
canon law."); McEnroy v. St. Meinrad Sch. ofTheology, 713 N.E.2d 334 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999)
(affmning dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction over Catholic theology professor's
contract and tort claims because "resolution of [her] claims would require the trial court to
interpret and apply religious doctrine and ecclesiastical law" including issues of ecclesiastical
jurisdiction and authority under canon law); Parent v. Roman Catholic Bishop, 436 A.2d 888,
890 (Me. 1981) (remarking that "the courts of this State have no jurisdiction" to assess "the
scope of the bishop's authority under canon law and the propriety of his exercise of that
authority inthis case"); Zimmerv. Nauman, No. C2-96-1066,1997WL 10520, at *2 (Minn.
Ct. App. June 16, 1997) ("We believe that the admission of canon law evidence would compel
the district court to construe and apply unfamiliar canons that are inherently doctrinal and
ecclesiastical in nature; such evidence could lead to excessive entanglement that is prohibited
under the Establishment Clause."), cert. denied, 118 U.S. 74 (1997); State v. Burckhard, 592
N.W.2d 523, 526 (N.D. 1999) (stating that after determining in a criminal theft prosecution,
under the Catholic Church's Code of Canon Law, the defendant priest's authority to expend
church funds was ultimately subject to the authority of his bishop, holding that any attempt
"to question [the bishop's] motives and have a jury make factual determinations about the
correctness of his administrative decisions ... would be in direct contravention of the
Establishment Clause" and that "[p]arishioners unhappy with their parishpriesthave recourse
through internal church procedures"). See generally Marianne Perciaccante, Note, The Courts
and Canon Law, 6 CoRNEL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 171 (1996).
34. See, e.g., Barghout v. Bureau of Kosher Meat & Food Control, 66 F.3d 1337,1349-50
(4th Cir. 1995) (Wilkins, J., concurring) (concluding that an anti-fraud ordinance regulating
the use of kosher designations was invalid under the Establishment Clause insofar as it
"creates an excessive entanglement because it requires an interpretation and determination
of religious law (i.e., whether the food represented to be kosher was, in fact, kosher) in
deciding whether there has been a violation"); Klagsbrun, 53 F. Supp. 2d at 741 (refusing,
under the Establishment Clause, to adjudicate a defamation claim that effectively necessitated
judicial inquiry "into the nature of a get [a religious divorce under Jewish law], how and
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points of religious doctrine, must essentially be deemed nonjusticiable.
Yet another concern, one very much at the heart ofthe general prohibition, arises
where a court attempts to subject a church's or cleric's conduct to an "objective"
standard of care, such as reasonableness or reasonable prudence, as would be
customary under the law of negligence. In these cases, the court's ultimate
determination may be tantamount to a state imprimatur-an official pronouncement
on what is, and what is not, a reasonable interpretation and expression of the
religious tradition in question. Such determinations run a particular risk of
transgressing both the first and the second manifestations of the general prohibition.
For instance, a determination that church or clergy conduct is reasonable or
unreasonable for tort purposes may appear to be, and indeed will function like, a
determination that a religious practice or an underlying religious tenet is itself
reasonable or unreasonable, especially if the court expresses its determination in
general terms.35 Correspondingly, if the court expresses its determination in a more
under what circumstances it may or may not be given, and who has the authority to grant a
get" and "into the nature and propriety of any special dispensation concerning a person's right
to remarry without first giving a get to his wife"); Ran-Day's County Kosher, Inc. v. State,
608 A.2d 1353 (N.J. 1992) (holding similarto Klagsbrun), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 592 (1993);
United Kosher Butchers Ass'n v. Associated Synagogues, 211 N.E.2d 332, 334-35 (Mass.
1965) (affining demurrer to suit necessitating examination ofwhat does and does not qualify
as kosher). But see Sossin Sys., Inc. v. City of Miami Beach, 262 So. 2d 28,29-30 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1972) (holding that an ordinance prohibiting the sale ofnon-kosher food labeled as
kosher does not violate the Establishment Clause). For a larger perspective on the propriety
of judicial analysis in matters both of Jewish dietary law and of Jewish marriage law, see
Kent Greenawalt, Religious Law and Civil Law: Using Secular Law To Assure Observance
of Practices with Religious Significance, 71 S. CAL. L. REv. 781 (1998).
35. See, e.g.,In re Pleasant GladeAssembly ofGod, 991 S.W.2d 85,90 (Tex. App. 1998)
(rejecting a variety of tort claims because "any inquiry into the appropriateness of the conduct
would necessarily involve an inquiry into the legitimacy of the underlying religious beliefs"),
order stayed on other grounds, No. 2-98-222-CV, 1999 WL 13249 (Tex. Ct App. Jan. 13,
1999); Murphy v. I.S.K.Con. of New Eng., Inc., 571 N.E.2d 340, 348 (Mass.), cert. denied,
502 U.S. 865 (1991).
Inherent in the claim that exposure to [the defendant institution's] religious
beliefs causes tortious emotional damage is the notion that the disputed beliefs
are fiudamentally flawed and inconsistent with a proper notion of human
development. .. . In a similar manner, the issue whether the Krishna
Consciousness religion adheres to an appropriate vision of the family is not for
the courts to decide. The defendant cannot be forced to choose between
censoring its religious scriptures to remove material which may be offensive to
contemporary society and paying tort damages for the privilege of maintaining
unpopular religious beliefs.
Id.; see also Ayon v. Gourley, 47 F. Supp. 2d 1246, 1250 (D. Colo. 1998) (holding that
adjudication of a negligent supervision claim would "cause excessive entanglement in church
operations by fostering inappropriate government involvement" because "[t]he application of
even general tort law principles to church procedures on the choice of priests would require
an inquiry into present practices with an intent to pass on their reasonableness"), affd, 185
F.3d 873 (10th Cir. 1999).
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particular way-say, relative to the religion's underlying corpus of beliefs and
practices-then the determination may amount to an exposition on the correct or
proper interpretation of the specific tenet or practice in question.36
Paradigmatic in this regard is the so-called tort of clergy malpractice. To date, in
fact, every jurisdiction presented with the opportunity has refused to recognize such
a cause of action,37 often because the issue of reasonableness-manifest as a
"reasonably prudent clergy" standard-so starkly and unavoidably reeks of
unconstitutional entanglement. Not only would such a standard be a prima facie
element of the tort, it would presumably require particularization-for example, the
reasonable Orthodox rabbi, the reasonable Roman Catholic priest, or the reasonable
Presbyterian Church (U.S.A.) minister-which would only further necessitate
government assessment of the religious doctrine.38 This is especially problematic
36. See, e.g., Doe v. Evans, 718 So. 2d 286, 291 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1998), review
granted, 735 So. 2d 1284 (Fla. 1999).
In a church defendant's determination to hire or retain a minister, or in its
capacity as supervisor of that minister, a church defendant's conduct is guided
by religious doctrine and/or practice. Thus, a court's determination regarding
whether the church defendant's conduct was "reasonable" would necessarily
entangle the court in issues ofthe church's religious law, practices, and policies.
Id.; see also Williams v. Bright, 658 N.Y.S.2d 910, 914 (N.Y. App. Div.) (refusing to adopt
a subjectivized reasonableness standard to assess the plaintiff's alleged religiously-based
failure to mitigate damages, stating that "[n]o secular court can decide--or, for that matter,
lead a jury to decide-what is the reasonable practice of a particular religion without setting
itself up as an ecclesiastical authority, and thus entangling it excessively in religious matters,
in clear violation ofthe First Amendment"), appeal dismissed, 686 N.E.2d 1368 (N.Y. 1997).
37. See, e.g., Amato v. Greenquist, 679 N.E.2d 446,450 (I. App. Ct. 1997).
Our courts have refused to entertain such claims because the first amendment's
free exercise clause prohibits courts from considering claims requiring the
interpretation of religious doctrine. To permit claims for clergy malpractice
would require courts to establish a standard of reasonable care for religious
practitioners practicing their respective faiths, which necessarily involves the
interpretation of doctrine.
Id. (citations omitted); see also H.R.B. v. J.L.G., 913 S.W.2d 92,99 n.4 (Mo. Ct. App. 1995)
(noting that "courts in other jurisdictions have uniformly refused to recognize clergy
malpractice as a cause of action for sexual misconduct of a cleric"); F.G. v. MacDonell, 696
A.2d 697, 703 (N.J. 1997) (disapproving a clergy malpractice action on First Amendment
grounds).
38. See Schmidt v. Bishop, 779 F. Supp. 321, 328 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).
Any effort by this Court to instruct the trial jury as to the duty of care which a
clergyman should exercise, would of necessity require the Court orjuryto define
and express the standard of care to be followed by other reasonable Presbyterian
clergy of the community. This in turn would require the Court and the jury to
consider the fundamental perspective and approach to counseling inherent in the
beliefs and practices of that denomination. This is as unconstitutional as it is
impossible. It fosters excessive entanglement with religion.
Id.; see also Gibson v. Brewer, 952 S.W.2d 239, 249-50 (Mo. 1997) (en banc) ("In order to
determine how a 'reasonably prudent Diocese' would act, a court would have to excessively
entangle itself in religious doctrine, policy, and administration."); Evans, 718 So. 2d at 291
("Each court to consider the viability of a clergy malpractice claim has concluded the First
[Vol. 75:219
DECLINE OF CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTION
where there is doctrinally-based intrachurch disagreement concerning the nature of
the pastoral function. In such cases, the court might very well have to adjudge
correct, and thus lend the state's imprimatur to, one of the contending sides, a role
generally forbidden by the precept that "[c]ourts are not arbiters of scriptural
interpretation 39 and specifically disavowed within the intrachurch property dispute
cases.4" These, moreover, are simply the problems that could arise with relatively
conventional religions; one can imagine the devilish time a court might have
attempting, for example, to formulate a standard for the reasonably prudent Satanist
practitioner.
Realizing these problems, the New Jersey Supreme Court recently added its voice
to the unanimous chorus of jurisdictions refusing to recognize the tort of clergy
malpractice. Two concerns, in particular, animated the court's holding. First, a clergy
malpractice claim "requires definition of the relevant standard of care. Defining that
standard could embroil courts in establishing the training, skill, and standards
applicable for members of the clergy in a diversity of religions with widely varying
Amendment bars claims for clergy malpractice because such a claim requires a court to
determine 'whether the adherent of a particular faith has properly interpreted the tenets of
that faith."') (quoting Dausch v. Rykse, 52 F.3d 1425, 1432 (7th Cir. 1994) (Ripple, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part in the judgment)); In re Pleasant Glade Assembly
of God, 991 S.W.2d at 89 (rejecting various tort claims partly because "[d]eciding whether
[the religious defendants] acted negligently... would require an impermissible inquiry into
whether they deviated from the standard of care of an ordinary Assembly of God
practitioner"); L.L.N. v. Clauder, 563 N.W.2d 434, 441-42 (Wis. 1997).
[N]egligent supervision claims would require a court to formulate a 'reasonable
cleric' standard, which would vary depending on the cleric involved, i.e.,
reasonable Presbyterian pastor standard, reasonable Catholic archbishop
standard, and so on. Such individualized standards would be required because,
as previously mentioned, church doctrines and practices are intertwined withthe
supervision and discipline of clergy.
Id. (citations omitted); see also James T. O'Reilly & Joann M. Strasser, Clergy Sexual
Misconduct: CotfrontingtheDifficultConstitutionalandInstitutionaLiabilitylssues, 7 ST.
THOMAS L. Rnv. 31, 46-47 (1994) ("Our pluralistic society dislikes having its neutral jurists
place themselves in the role of a 'reasonable chief rabbi,' 'reasonable bishop,' etc., because
of the degree of involvement that must accompany such a decisional framework for the civil
tortjudge."); cf. Briggs & Stratton Corp. v. National Catholic Rptr. Publ'g Co., 978 F. Supp.
1195, 1198 (E.D. Wis. 1997) (noting, in a defamation case where plaintiffs allegedly
suggested that defendants' conduct was inconsistent with Catholic teaching, that "[t]he First
Amendment and applicable state law prevent the court from developing a 'reasonable
Catholic' standard of care").
39. Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707, 716 (1981).
40. See, e.g., Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595, 604 (1979) (holding that if"the interpretation
of the instruments of ownership would require the civil court to resolve a religious
controversy, then the court must defer to the resolution of the doctrinal issue by the
authoritative ecclesiastical body"); Presbyterian Church in U.S. v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull
Mem'l Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. 440,449 (1969) (noting that "FirstAmendment values
are plainly jeopardized when church property litigation is made to turn on the resolution by
civil courts of controversies over religious doctrine and practice").
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beliefs."41 Second, "defining such a standard would require courts to identify the
beliefs and practices of the relevant religion and then to determine whether the
clergyman had acted in accordance with them."'
Similar or analogous reasoning has led many (though not all) courts also to reject
claims against religious defendants for breach offiduciary duty,' negligent hiring or
41. F.G., 696 A.2d at 703.
42. Id.; see alsoNally v. Grace Community Church ofthe Valley, 763 P.2d 948, 960 (Cal.
1988) ("[f1t would certainly be impractical, and quite possibly unconstitutional, to impose a
duty of care onpastoral counselors."), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1007 (1989). For a free exercise
critique of recognizing clergy malpractice, see Destefano v. Grabrian, 763 P.2d 275, 290
(Colo. 1988) (Quinn, C.J., specially concurring).
Legislative or judicial recognition of the so-called tort of "clergy malpractice"
would be fundamentally flawed on two counts. First, it would result in
secularizing various forms of sectarian religious counseling that are entitled to
constitutional protection. Second, itwould undoubtedly result in deterring some
ministers, priests, and rabbis from engaging in marriage counseling in order to
avoid any potential liability .... The resulting effect on the religious counselor's
right to engage in bona fide religious marriage counseling, independently of
secular standards applicable to licensed professionals, would... fly directly in
the face of the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment.
Id.
43. See, e.g., Ivers v. Church of St. William, No. C2-98-519, 1998 WL 887536, at *3
(Minn. Ct. App. Dec. 22, 1998).
We conclude that analysis of the threshold issue of whether a fiduciary
relationship existed would require this court to define the scope of the duty, if
any, owed to individuals by their clergy, a matter fundamentally connected to
issues of church organization and governance. Because it would necessarily
involve the court in excessive entanglement in church matters by evaluating
religious tenets and internal affairs of the church and archdiocese, the
Constitution precludes us from making such an analysis.
Id.; see also, Doe v. Evans, 718 So. 2d 286, 293 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1998) (joining "those
courts finding a First Amendment bar to a breach of fiduciary duty claim as against church
defendants, concluding resolution of such a claim would necessarily require the secular court
to review and interpret church law, policies, and practices"); Amato v. Greenquist, 679
N.E.2d 446, 454 (11l. App. Ct. 1997) (holding that breach of fiduciary duty arising from a
clergy-parishioner relationship is not actionable because "when a parishioner lodges such a
claim, religion is not 'merely incidental' to a plaintiff's relationship with a defendant, 'it [is]
the foundation for it.' The fiduciary relationship is inescapably premised upon the cleric's
status as an expert in theological and spiritual matters." (quoting H.RB. v. J.L.G., 913
S.W.2d 92, 99 (Mo. Ct. App. 1995))); H.R.B., 913 S.W.2d at 98 (noting that courts rejecting
a cause of action for breach of fiduciary duty against clergy or religious organizations
concluded that "analyzing and defining the scope of fiduciary duty owed persons by their
clergy... 'would require the Court and the jury to consider the fundamental perspective and
approach to counseling inherent in the beliefs and practices of that denomination"' (quoting
Schmidt v. Bishop, 779 F. Supp. 321, 328 (S.D.N.Y. 1991))); Schieffer v. Catholic
Archdiocese, 508 N.W.2d 907, 912 (Neb. 1993) (following Schmidt and rejecting the cause
ofaction on constitutional grounds); Langford v. Roman Catholic Diocese, 677 N.Y.S.2d 436,
439 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1998) (rejecting a claim for breach of fiduciary duty because "it is
impossible to show the existence of a fiduciary relationship without resort to religious facts"
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retention or transfer,44 negligent supervision,45 tortious interference with contract,46
and "[i]n order to consider the validity of plaintiff's claims of dependency and vulnerability,
the jury would have to weigh and evaluate, inter alia, the legitimacy ofplaintiff's beliefs, the
tenets of the faith insofar as they reflect upon a priest's ability to act as God's emissary and
the nature of the healing powers of the church.") (emphasis in original).
44. See, e.g., Ayon v. Gourley, 47 F. Supp. 2d 1246, 1250 (D. Colo. 1998) (holding that
a "negligent hiring claim would violate both the Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses"
because "consideration ofthe hiring policies of the Archdiocese Defendants would inevitably
require examination of church policy and doctrine"), aff'd, 185 F.3d 873 (10th Cir. 1999);
Isely v. Capuchin Province, 880 F. Supp. 1138, 1150 (E.D. Mich. 1995) (noting that
"[q]uestions of hiring and retention of clergy necessarily will require interpretation of church
canons, and internal church policies and practices" and that "any inquiry into the decision of
who should be permitted to become or remain a priest necessarily would involve prohibited
excessive entanglement with religion"); Schmidt v. Bishop, 779 F. Supp. 321,332 (S.D.N.Y.
1991).
[A]ny inquiry into the policies and practices of the Church Defendants in hiring
or supervising their clergy raises . . . First Amendment problems of
entanglement... ,which might involve the Court in making sensitive judgments
about the propriety of the Church Defendants' supervision in light of their
religious beliefs .... Any award of damages would have a chilling effect leading
indirectly to state control over the future conduct of affairs of a religious
denomination, a result violative of the text and history of the establishment
clause.
Id.; see also Evans, 718 So. 2d at 291 (holding that the First Amendment bars claims for
negligent hiring and retention); Gibson v. Brewer, 952 S.W.2d 239, 247 (Mo. 1997) (en banc)
(holding that adjudication of negligent hiring, ordination, and retention claims would violate
the First Amendment); Pritzlaffv. Archdiocese of Milwaukee, 533 N.W.2d 780, 791 (Wis.
1995) (holding that "the tort of negligent hiring and retention may not be maintained against
a religious governing body due to concerns of excessive entanglement"), cert. denied, 516
U.S. 1116 (1996).
45. See, e.g.,Evans, 718 So. 2d at291 (holding that the FirstAmendmentbars a negligent
supervision claim); Swanson v. Roman Catholic Bishop of Portland, 692 A.2d 441,444-45
(Me. 1997) (rejecting a negligent supervision claim on constitutional grounds); Mulinix v.
Mulinix, No. C2-97-297, 1997 WL 585775, at *6 (Minn. Ct. App. Sept. 22, 1997) (refusing
to adjudicate claims of negligent retention and supervision because they "are fundamentally
connected to issues of church governance" and their adjudication "would necessitate inquiry
into the church's motives fornot discharging [the defendant pastor], as well ashow the church
investigates and resolves complaints concerning clergy misconduct"); Pritzlaff, 533 N.W.2d
at 791 (holding that "the tort of negligent training or supervision cannot be successfully
asserted in this case because it would require an inquiry into church laws, practices and
policies"); Gibson, 952 S.W.2d at 247 ("Adjudicating the reasonableness of a church's
supervision of a cleric-what the church 'should know'-requires inquiry into religious
doctrine.... [Tjhis would create an excessive entanglement, inhibit religion, and result in the
endorsement of one model of supervision."); Heroux v. Carpentier, No. C.A. PC 92-5807,
1998 WL 388298, at *9 (R.I. Super. Ct. Jan. 23, 1998) (refusing to adjudicate a claim of
negligent "assignment, supervision, and control of religious subordinates" because "in order
for it to determine whether or not the relation between a bishop and his priests is sufficiently
agent-like to give rise to a common law duty to exercise reasonable care in the exercise of
whatever supervisory authority the bishop has the Court is required to examine and analyze
the rules, policies and doctrine of the Roman Catholic Church.")
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negligent infliction of emotional distress,47 and defamation or other
46. See, e.g., Singleton v. Christ the Servant Evangelical Lutheran Church, 541 N.W.2d
606, 614 (Minn. Ct. App.) (deciding not to permit such a claim by aterminated pastor against
his synod), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 870 (1996)
[T]he court would have to consider whether the bishop and his assistants acted
reasonably ... [and] review of the duties of the bishop and his assistants,
matters of church goveriance within the Synod, the relationship between the
Church and the Synod, the Synod's obligation to provide pastoral care, the
Synod's obligation to discipline its member churches for violations of the
Synod's constitution, and the bishop's authority to settle disputes within the
Synod's member churches.
Id. (also noting that "[t]hese matters are ecclesiastical concerns not reviewable under the First
Amendment").
47. See, e.g., Gibson, 952 S.W.2d at 248-49 ("To determine whether the Diocese's
responses to its members' claims were 'reasonable,' a court would inevitably judge the
reasonableness of religious beliefs, discipline, and government. Applying a negligence
standard to the actions of the Diocese in dealing with its parishioners offends the First
Amendment."). Several courts have also refused to adjudicate claims ofintentional infliction
of emotional distress in such cases. See, e.g., Evans, 718 So. 2d at 293-94 (rejecting a claim
of intentional infliction of emotional distress in part because it "would... be barred by the
First Amendment"); Tilton v. Marshall, 925 S.W.2d 672, 681 (Tex. 1996) ("Resolving
whether Tilton has intentionally inflicted emotional distress through the making of insincere
religious representations would inevitably require an inquiry into whether Tilton's religious
beliefs are true or false.").
48. See, e.g., Hutchison v. Thomas, 789 F.2d 392, 393-96 (6th Cir.) (affrming dismissal
of defamation-related wrongful termination claim on FirstAmendment grounds), cert. denied,
479 U.S. 885 (1986); Klagsbrun v. Va'ad Harabonim ofGreaterMonsey, 53 F. Supp. 2d 732,
741 (D.N.J. 1999) (concluding that the plaintiff's claims of defamation-including allegedly
false statements by an association of rabbis that he committed bigamy (as a matter of Jewish
law, not civil law), failed to comply with a rabbinical court order, and failed to submit to a
rabbinical court's jurisdiction--'ould require this court to undertake an examination of
underlying religious doctrine orpractice" and, "[a]ccordinglyjurisdiction must be declined");
Farley v. Wisconsin Evangelical Lutheran Synod, 821 F. Supp. 1286, 1288-90 (D. Minn.
1993) (dismissing a minister's defamation suit on First Amendment grounds); O'Connor v.
Diocese of Honolulu, 885 P.2d 361, 368 (Haw. 1994) (refusing to adjudicate a defamation
claim because "to determine the truth or falsity of the [allegedly defamatory] statements, a
state court would have to inquire into church teachings and doctrine."). More specifically, the
court noted:
[TIhe secular law cannot determine: (1) 'criminal penal ecclesiastical' violations;
(2) schism; (3) whether church lawis violated by establishing a separate church;
(4) whether one has misrepresented the Roman Catholic faith, (5) whether, in
matters of church dogma, one is a fanatic or has a neolithic frame of mind; (6)
whether one is duping the faithful; (7) whether one causes others to lose their
souls; (8) whether one is disloyal to the Pope; or (9) whether one must be
excommunicated to save other souls.
Id.; see also Brazauskas v. Fort Wayne-S. Bend Diocese, Inc., 714 N.E.2d 253 (Ind. Ct App.
1999) (holding that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over a defamation claim
against religious defendants because its adjudication would have entailed "an impermissible
scrutiny of religious doctrine" and noting more generally that "when officials of a religious
organization state their reasons forterminating a pastoral employee in ostensibly ecclesiastical
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tortious speech.49 In addition, most courts appear to reject the idea that uniquely
religious acts, such as excommunication or shunning or exorcism, should be
actionable in tort,5" although the permissibility of such claims would likely raise
terms, the FirstAmendment effectively prohibits civil tribunals from reviewing these reasons
to determine whether the statements are either defamatory or capable of a religious
interpretation related to the employee's performance"); McManus v. Taylor, 521 So. 2d 449,
451 (La. Ct. App. 1988) (sustaining defendants' exception of lack of subject matter
jurisdiction over a defamation claim because its adjudication would require the "courts [to]
investigate the propriety ofproceedings conducted by [plaintiff's] church in the interpretation
and application of church rules"); Downs v. Roman Catholic Archbishop of Baltimore, 683
A.2d 808, 811 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1996) (extending the prohibition of the intrachurch
dispute cases to a defamation action brought by a former candidate for the priesthood);
Jeambey v. Synod of Lakes & Prairies, No. CX-95-902, 1995 WL 619814, at *3 (Minn. Ct.
App. Oct. 24,1995) (holding that the plaintiff's "defamation claim requires animpermissible
inquiry into church doctrine and discipline" and thus that "review of this claim is
prohibited"); Schoenhalsv. Mains, 504N.W.2d233, 236 (Minn. Ct. App. 1993) (holding that
"[s]ince examination of the truth of [the defendant's] statements would require an
impermissible inquiry into Church doctrine and discipline, the district court did not err in
concluding that the defamation claim is precluded by the First Amendment"); Jackson v.
Presbytery of Susquehanna Valley, 686 N.Y.S.2d273,274-75 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.) (noting that the
"refisal to exercise jurisdiction over ecclesiastical-related matters has extended to allegations,
such as here, of defamation" and ultimatelyrefusing to exercise jurisdiction), afJd, No. 2147,
1999 WL 978096 (N.Y. App. Div. Oct. 26, 1999); Howard v. Covenant Apostolic Church,
Inc., 705 N.E.2d 385, 388-89 (Ohio Ct. App. 1997) (rejecting church member's defamation
claim-based on the defendants' alleged statements that the plaintiff "had lied, that he was
in league with Satan, that he had been overtaken by a fall, that he was a defiler of the temple
and an enemy of the Church, and that he was 'sleeping around"--because "[t]he allegedly
defamatory statements made by Church members, trustees, or agents in terminating
appellant's membership in the Church... [were] inextricably intertwined with ecclesiastical
or religious issues over which secular courts have no jurisdiction"), appeal not allowed, 688
N.E.2d 1043 (Ohio 1998); Tran v. Fiorenza, 934 S.W.2d 740, 743-44 (Tex. App. 1996)
(dismissing a priest's defamation claim).
49. See, e.g., Stansfield v. Starkey, 269 Cal. Rptr. 337, 345 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990) (holding
that a threat that one's relatives "would be damned in Hell forever" were one to leave the
churchwill not be actionable if the speech, at bottom, is essentially a religious or theological
assertion) (quoting Molko v. Holy Spirit Ass'n, 762 P.2d 46, 64 (Cal. 1988), cert. denied, 490
U.S. 1084 (1989)); Snyder v. Evangelical Orthodox Church, 264 Cal. Rptr. 640,644 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1989) (refusing to adjudicate a claim that plaintiff was threatened with the
nonabsolution of his sins if he did not meditate in isolation for one week); Smith v. Tilton,
No. 05-96-00071-CV, 1999 WL 649359, at *7-*8 (Tex. Ct. App. Aug. 25, 1999) (affirming
dismissal ofnegligent misrepresentation claim because the defendants-appellees' statements
relating to past and future occurrences of miracles "constitute representations of appellees'
religious beliefs," such that "the truthfulness or reasonableness of these statements is
protected from judicial scrutiny by the FirstAmendment to the United States Constitution and
article one, section six of the Texas Constitution").
50. See, e.g., Paul v. Watchtower Bible & Trust Soc'y, 819 F.2d 875, 878-83 (9th Cir.)
(rejecting a variety of shunning-related tort claims by a disassociated Jehovah's Witness,
holding that such claims would violate the federal and Washington state constitutions), cert.
denied, 484 U.S. 926 (1987); Grunwald v. Bornfreund, 696 F. Supp. 838, 840-41 (E.D.N.Y.
1988) (rejecting tort action for excommunication because "[t]he mere expulsion from a
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separate concerns and their disallowance may rest on other grounds."
religious society, with the exclusion from a religious community, is not a harm for which
courts can grant a remedy"; "[fin this case, plaintiff asks the Court to do something it is not
able to do either as a matter of federal jurisprudence or under the first amendment: decide
whether plaintiff should be excommunicated from his religious community for prosecuting
this suit against defendants"); Lewis v. Holy Spirit Ass'n for Unification of World
Christianity, 589 F. Supp. 10, 12 (D. Mass. 1983) (rejecting claims oftortious brainwashing
and indoctrination in part because "[i]ndoctrination and initiation procedures and conditions
of membership in a religious organization are generally not subject to judicial review"); In
re Pleasant Glade Assembly of God, 991 S.W.2d 85, 89 (Tex. CL App. 1998) (refusing to
adjudicate various tort claims arising from an allegedly wrongful attempt to cast out demons,
not only because church doctrine would be centrally implicated but also because the emotional
distress claims involved "intangible or emotional harm," which "cannot ordinarily serve as
a basis for maintaining a tort cause of action against a church for religious practices"), order
stayed on other grounds, No. 2-98-222-CV, 1999 WL 13249 (Tex. App. Jan. 13, 1999); see
also United Baptist Church, Inc. v. Holmes, 500 S.E.2d 653, 654 (Ga. Ct App. 1998).
The courts of Georgia under the First Amendment of the Constitution of the
United States and Art. I, Sec. I, Par. IV of the 1983 Constitution of Georgia are
prohibited from determining issues of expulsion of members, pastors, and the
internal procedures of a religious entity because "[ilnextricably entangled is
whether the priest's performance of his duties as a priest met the requirements
of his church as measured by ecclesiastical concerns." Likewise, "the validity of
the expulsion of the [plaintiff] as [a member] of the church ... grow[s] out of a
controversy relating to the faith, teaching, doctrine, and discipline of the
church"; therefore, courts are prohibited from inquiring into expulsion of
members of a religious entity.
Id, (alterations and emphasis in original) (citations omitted) (quoting McDonnell v. Episcopal
Diocese, 381 S.E.2d 126, 128 (Ga. Ct App. 1989), and Stewart v. Jarriel, 59 S.E.2d 368, 370
(Ga. 1950), respectively). Butsee Lightman v. Flaum, 687 N.Y.S.2d 562 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1999)
(holding that the plaintiff could pursue a claim against her rabbi for breach of the
clergy-penitent privilege); Bear v. Reformed Mennonite Church, 341 A.2d 105, 107 (Pa.
1975) (allowing suit for shunning to proceed). The court observed that the challenged conduct
may be an excessive interference within areas of"paramount state concern," i.e.
the maintenance ofmarriage and family relationship, alienation of affection, and
the tortious interference with a business relationship, which the courts of this
Commonwealth may have authority to regulate, even in light of the
"Establishment" and "Free Exercise" clauses of the First Amendment.
Id. (emphasis in original).
51. To a large extent, such claims are barred under the third component of the general
prohibition, which typically requires deference to ecclesiastical decisions. See, e.g., Howard,
705 N.E.2d at 387-88. One additional concern, however, particularly in regard to claims of
wrongful excommunication or expulsion, is that church or congregational membership would
likely have to be recognized as a legal right or interest. Not only would enforcement of this
right potentially encroach upon the autonomy of religious institutions and entail examination
of whether the church complied with its own doctrines of membership, see Martinez v.
Primera Asemblea de Dios, Inc., No. 05-96-01458-CV, 1998 WL 242412, at *3 (Tex. App.
May 15, 1998) (holding that a church may not be held liable for wrongful termination of
membership because such a claim would intrude on the church's internal governance and
would require the court "to interpret Christian scriptures rather than neutral principles of
law," although allowing claims for negligent hiring, supervision, and training of a church
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Having noted what appears to be the majority position, it should further be pointed
out that the courts are far from uniform in their refusal to adjudicate tort actions
against religious entities. With the exception of clergy malpractice, in fact, courts are
otherwise divided,5 2 although again the general rule appears to be one of
nonadjudicability. The following Part will examine not only the potential sources of
this division, but also the forces that may increasingly undermine the extant rule.
II. THE CAUSES OF ITS POTENTIAL DEMISE
INTHETORT CONTEXT
Constitutional protection of an interest or class, once accorded or recognized, is not
often categorically eliminated. Though the scope of protection may regularly change,
even dramatically,53 it is much rarer that an entire species of liberty, or an entire class
elder), but it could also raise a more basic issue concerning the cognizability of religious but
nonconstitutional interests. See generally Fowler v. Bailey, 844 P.2d 141, 143-46 (Okla.
1992) (stating these concerns and the general rule ofnonadjudication, though noting a few
contrary rulings).
A"civil or property right" that justifies the exercise of civil judicial power has
long been distinguished from ecclesiastical or "spiritual" rights that civil courts
do not adjudicate. Civil courts in this country recognize that they have no
ecclesiastical jurisdiction, and church disciplinary decisions cannot be reviewed
for the purpose of reinstating expelled church members.
Id. at 144 (footnote omitted).
52. See, e.g., Doe v. Hartz, 970 F. Supp. 1375, 1431-32 (N.D. Iowa 1997) (citing cases
and noting the "split of authority" over the adjudicability of negligent supervision claims),
rev'd in part and vacated in part on other grounds, 134 F.3d 1339 (8th Cir. 1998); Moses v.
Diocese ofColo., 863 P.2d 310,321 (Colo. 1993) (holding that the First Amendment does not
bar a breach of fiduciary duty claim insofar as church doctrine need not be interpreted), cert.
denied, 511 U.S. 1137 (1994); Doe v. Evans, 718 So. 2d 286, 291 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1998)
(recognizing that "there also exists authority finding no bar to a claim for negligent hiring,
retention, and supervision" although noting that"this result most often appears in the context
of criminal sexual conduct" (citing Nutt v. Norwich Roman Catholic Diocese, 921 F. Supp.
66 (D. Conn. 1995)), review granted, 735 So. 2d 1284 (Fla. 1999); Amato v. Greenquist, 679
N.E.2d 446,454 (Ill. App. Ct. 1997) (noting conflicting cases on the adjudicability of breach
of fiduciary duty claims); Konkle v. Henson, 672 N.E.2d 450 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996); Mrozka
v. Archdiocese of St. Paul & Minneapolis, 482 N.W.2d 806 (Minn. Ct. App. 1992); Gibson
v. Brewer, 952 S.W.2d 239,248 (Mo. 1997) (en banc) (listing cases divided over whether to
recognize negligent supervision claims); F.G. v. MacDonell, 696 A.2d 697,702 (N.J. 1997)
(noting cases in which various tort claims against religious entities have been allowed);
Kenneth R. v. Roman Catholic Diocese, 654 N.Y.S.2d 791 (N.Y. App. Div.), cert. denied,
118 S. Ct. 413 (1997), leave to appeal dismissed, 690 N.E.2d 492 (N.Y. 1997); Jones v.
Trane, 591 N.Y.S.2d 927 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1992); Gallas v. Greek OrthodoxArchdiocese, 587
N.Y.S.2d 82 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1991); Erickson v. Christenson, 781 P.2d 383 (Or. Ct. App.
1989), appeal dismissed, 817 P.2d 758 (Or. 1991).
53. For example, compare Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990) (holding that
neutral, generally applicable legal burdens on religious practice should be subjected to
minimal scrutiny), with Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) (holding without
qualification that such burdens should be subjected to strict scrutiny). Also, comparePlanned
Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992) (holding that pre-viability legal restrictions on
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of claimants, is altogether removed from the realm of constitutional cognizance.'
Stare decisis, if nothing else, dictates such conservatism.55 In turn, this inertial
tendency suggests that any claim that a principle will be largely if not entirely
abrogated should be presumed incorrect at the outset, and that one or more very good
reasons must be offered in support of the claim.
This Part ofthe Article shall present a multitude offactors that, taken together, do
point towards the eventual erosion or abrogation of the constitutional prohibition on
subjecting religious entities to standard forms of tort adjudication. For analytical
purposes, these factors havebeen divided into three categories: cultural, institutional,
and doctrinal or theoretical.
A. Cultural Factors
Given the potential dynamic between cultural norms and legal rules, any projection
into the legal future must take account of such norms and their likely trajectories.
Generally speaking, in order for legal change to occur, the legal or political processes
must be engaged by one or more external stimuli, such as the institution of litigation,
a proposal of legislation, a shift in public attitudes, pressure from the media, the
lobbying of a cause, and the like.' Here, the most obvious external stimulus is the
private institution of civil litigation against religious entities. Indeed, while there is
much debate over whether or not American society has in general become
increasingly litigious, especially in regard to tort actions, such actions specifically
against religious entities and individuals do appear to be on the rise.57
abortion should be subjected to an intermediate-though nonbalancing-undue burden
standard), with City ofAkron v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, 462 U.S. 416,427 (1983)
(holding that "restrictive state regulation ofthe right to choose abortion ... must be supported
by a compelling state interest"), overruled in part by Casey, 505 U.S. at 882.
54. The liberty of contract recognized in such cases as Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45
(1905), and since repudiated, see Casey, 505 U.S. at 861 (recognizing the repudiation),
provides one example.
55. See Hugh Baxter, Managing Legal Change: The Transformation of Establishment
Clause Law, 46 UCLA L. REV. 343, 346 (1998).
While as the Court has said repeatedly, "[s]tare decisis is not an inexorable
command," and while the Court on occasion overrules its own decisions, still,
stare decisis limits-or at least influences-the Court's transformation of the
law. In some cases when the Court's inclination toward legal change is weak,
stare decisis likely prevents the Court from overruling. And even when the
impulse to change is stronger, overruling has costs for the prevailing
majority-perhaps impaired relations with fellow Justices who would have
adhered to the precedent, the sting of a dissenting opinion, professional
criticism, and sometimes public disapproval.
Id. (alteration and emphasis in original) (footnotes omitted) (quoting Agostini v. Felton, 521
U.S. 203, 235 (1997)).
56. See generally LEE EpsTEIN &JOSEPHF. KOBYuyA, THE STPREME COURT AND LEGAL
CHANGE: ABORTION AND THE DEATH PENALTY ch.2 (1992) (discussing the "agents of legal
change" within the context of Supreme Court decisionmaking).
57. See, e.g., John H. Arnold, Clergy SexualMalpractice, 8 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 25,
26 (1996) (noting "the outpouring, or 'epidemic' as one legal observer has called it, of
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This increase in and of itself is significant, especially if it serves to desensitize
judges, juries, and other potential litigants to the acceptability of religious entities as
defendants. Equally significant, however, are a host of accompanying phenomena
that may serve either as causes of the increase in litigation, as forces that could
transform the outcome of this litigation, or as both. At the causal level, for example,
it has been suggested that plaintiffs may simply be less reluctant than in the past to
bring suits against religious defendants," perhaps because churches and clergy no
longer stand in the same revered position vis-a-vis parishioners59 or because the
availability of insurance makes suing one's church a less unpalatable undertaking.6"
Regardless of its origins, this new willingness to bring suit is important in at least
two respects. First and most obvious, it increasingly places the relevant issues-such
lawsuits against clergymen and their churches") (footnote omitted) (quoting ROBERT W.
MCMENAmiN, CLERGY MALPRACTICE 5 (1986)); O'Reilly & Strasser, supra note 38, at 32
("With increasing frequency, victims of sexual abuse have targeted churches in lawsuits
alleging sexual abuse by clergy and claiming direct or vicarious liability of the affiliated
religious organization."); Marc L. Terry, Disclosure of Church Archives in Cases of Criminal
Misconduct by Clergymen, 1 SUFFoLK J. TRIAL & APPELLATE ADvoc. 95, 95 (1995)
("Throughout the past decade, an alarming number of allegations of sexual misconduct have
been made against Catholic priests."); David 3. Young & Stephen W. Tigges, Into the
Religious Thicket-2-Constitutional Limits on Civil Court Jurisdiction over Ecclesiastical
Disputes, 47 OHIO ST. L.J. 475, 475 (1986).
Ithas been widelynoted that individuals and associations alike are turning to the
civil courts with increasing frequency for resolution of their disputes. Religious
organizations have not been excluded fromthis trend. As aresult, church counsel
increasingly are being called upon to defend their clients in litigation which
quite often raises issues at the heart of church organization and government
Id. (citing examples); see also Lindsey Rosen, Recent Decision, In Bad Faith: Breach of
Fiduciary Duty by the Clergy-F.G. v. MacDnell, 71 TEMP. L. REV. 743, 743 (1998)
(observing that "[w]ithin the past decade ... the frequency of lawsuits arising out of pastoral
counseling has risen dramatically").
58. See, e.g., Lee W. Brooks, Note, Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress by
Spiritual Counselors: Can Outrageous Conduct Be "Free Exercise"?, 84 MiCH. L. REv.
1296, 1300 n.12 (1986) ("'There was always the reluctance to sue a member of the clergy,'
says Lee Boothby, a Michigan attorney.. . . 'Lawyers wouldn't even take such cases. That
inhibition has left completely."' (quoting Susan Carey, Faith and the Law, WALL ST. J., Apr.
9, 1985, at 1)).
59. See Arnold, supra note 57, at 26 (noting "the falling esteem of the clergy, which has
created a social climate conducive to the reporting of sexual abuse").
60. See Greg Slater, Note, Nally v. Grace Community Church of the Valley: Absolution
forClergyMalpractice?, 1989 BYUL. REV. 913, 936 n.130 ('Perhaps it could be argued that
clergy malpractice insurance relieves the fear of liability, yet, a deep pocket like Church
Mutual Insurance Company may persuade plaintiffs to overcome their reluctance to sue.").
The availability of insurance was certainly a factor in the decline ofthe charitable immunity
doctrine. See Daniel A. Barfield, Note, Better To Give Than To Receive: Should Nonprofit
Corporations and Charities Pay Punitive Damages?, 29 VAL. U. L. REv. 1193, 1195-96
(1995) (noting that "[a]mong the reasons cited for the demise of the doctrine of charitable
immunity were the development of an advanced insurance industry and the growth of the
nonprofit sector" and that "[c]ourts reasoned that any burden placed on charities because of
tort liability could be alleviated if charities purchased insurance").
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as reasonableness of conduct, potential liability, and deterrence-before the legal
system, and specifically before judges and possibly juries. Second, it is
self-generating: the perceived willingness of some victims to bring suit may prompt
still others themselves to bring suit, especially if plaintiffs do periodically prevail.
Another phenomenon, one that is arguably both causal and transformative, is the
seemingly disproportionate media attention given to alleged misconduct by clergy
and their institutions, especially where the misconduct appears particularly
outrageous." While media coverage of religion in general has often been criticized,62
there certainly has been no shortage of coverage in cases of alleged clergy
wrongdoing. Far from being relegated to the religion section of the newspaper's
backpages, "[aiccounts of clergy misconduct have been among the most challenging
and sensational revelations in the media in the recent past"63 Not only may such
media attention spur potential plaintiffs to file suit (though it may discourage
others),64 it may also serve to "put pressure on the courts and the churches to do what
is necessary to alter pastoral conduct."65 This pressure may be either direct, whereby
media accounts by their own force influence judges, or indirect, whereby the media
influences public attitudes, which in turn affect judicial decisionmaking.
Related to both plaintiff willingness and media attention is an apparent growing
61. See, e.g., Arnold, supra note 57, at 26 (noting the "media attention given to certain
cases"); O'Reilly & Strasser, supra note 38, at 31 ("Sexual misconduct among clergy
members... [has been] made more evident in the 1990s by dramatic news reporting and
high-profile litigation demands. Revelation is no longer just an uplifting part of the New
Testament; revelation is a tabloid tactic for uplifting television ratings and newspaper sales
by assailing massive sexual scandals in the churches."); Janice D. Villiers, Clergy
Malpractice Revisited: Liability for Sexual Misconduct in the Counseling Relationship, 74
DENY. U. L. REv. 1, 2 (1996) (noting that "[r]ecently, clergy accused of pedophilia have
garnered considerable press attention").
62. See, e.g., David Shaw, The Pope and the Press: Too Much Sensationalism, Too Little
Substance?, L.A. TaIES, Apr. 18, 1995, atAl (documenting alleged distortion of the Roman
Catholic Church by American media in Part Three of a four-part series); David Shaw, The
Pope and the Press: Too Much Sensationalism, Too Little Substance?, L.A. TMEs, Apr. 16,
1995, at Al (similar, noting critics' claim that the media coverage of the Roman Catholic
Church exposes "structural flaws in the news media" such as "a propensity for
sensationalism, conflict and oversimplification and an ignorance of (and often hostility
toward) religion in general and Catholicism in particular") (Part One of four-part Series). For
a more general examination ofimedia reporting ofreligion, undertaken by the Freedom Forum
FirstAmendment Center of VanderbiltUniversity, see JoHNDART&JIMMYALEN, BRIDGING
TiE GAP: RELIGION AmD THE NEWS MEDIA (1993).
63. David V. White, When the Wolf Tends the Flock: Clergy Misconduct and Marital
Counseling, 82 ILL. B.J. 194, 194 (1994).
64. See O'Reilly & Strasser, supra note 38, at 37 (noting that "[t]he publicity surrounding
major abuse cases and the success of plaintiffs has empowered victims to... speak out and
pursue civil actions").
65. Constance Frisby Fain, Clergy Malpractice: Liabilityfor Negligent Counseling and
Sexual Misconduct, 12 Miss. C. L. REv. 97, 118 (1991) ("Perhaps continued filing of clergy
malpractice claims and persistent, unrelenting media reports addressing this issue will put
pressure on the courts and the churches to do what is necessary to alter pastoral conduct.")
(footnote omitted).
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public sympathy for the victims of clergy exploitation-and possibly a corresponding
antipathy towards the clergy who commit such exploitation and the religious
institutions that appear, by their action or inaction, to be facilitating it if not actually
covering it up.66 We live, it would seem, in an era of heightened sensitivity to those
who claim injury or some other victimlike status, and our chosen means of redress for
alleged past harm is compensation, achieved by holding the tortfeasor monetarily
liable.67 At the same time, we appear to live in an era in which many
institutions-including religious institutions-command diminished respect and in
which their authority is often greeted with skepticism.6 Together, these two cultural
trends make it especially difficult for one to persuasively insist, on constitutional
grounds or otherwise, that religious institutions ought to be effectively shielded from
the claims of their tort victims.
Finally-and related to all three phenomena thus far documented-the public and
the media appear generally to undervalue, if not altogether overlook, the First
Amendment issues at stake in the adjudication of tort actions against religious
defendants. Few media reports address, with any sensitivity or sophistication at least,
the many potential constitutional or theological aspects of such tort actions, focusing
instead upon the grave, sometimes lurid nature of the harm allegedly inflicted or,
66. See Lisa M. Smith, Lifting the Veil of Secrecy: Mandatory Child Abuse Reporting
Statutes MayEncourage the Catholic Church to Report Priests Who Molest Children, 18 LAW
&PsYcHoL. REv. 409,412 (1994); Villiers, supra note 61, at 2 (claiming that"clergy accused
of pedophilia have garnered... the ire of the general public").
67. See Bernard E. Boland, A New Professional IdentityforBench and Bar: Pour Rambo
et Snidely unKepiBlanc, 25 WM.MrrcHELLL. REV. 117,123 (1999) (remarking that "[s]tate
legislatures clamor to create a cause of action for every actual and imagined insult and wrong,
and scores of heretofore-undiscovered victims have emerged in every walk and endeavor");
cf. Michael E. Solimine, Activism and Politics on State Supreme Courts, 57 U. CN. L. REv.
987, 989-90 (1989) ("With the exception of libel law (informed by First Amendment
concerns), the post-World War If tort lawrevolution has been inexorably pro-recovery. Privity
has fallen, immunities abrogated, and strict liability imposed.") (reviewing G. ALAN TARR &
MARY CA. PORTER, STATE SUPREME COURTs IN STATE AND NATION (1988)).
68. See Boland, supra note 67, at 119,128 (noting "a popular and ephemeral nihilism that
has afflicted all of our professions and institutions" and commenting that "no institution or
profession has fared well over the past thirty years-the government, the press, religion and
education have all taken severe hits in public confidence"); Spencer Lewerenz, Choice of a
New Generation?, CRIsIS, Apr. 1999, at 22, 24 (arguing that "[p]op culture's revolutionary
challenge of religious authority ... must be acknowledged by religious institutions" and that
the Catholic Church, for one, "does not hold the political and cultural stature that she once
did") (discussing TOM BEAUDOIN, VIRTUALFAr-: ThE IRtRVERENT SPIITUAL JOURNEY OF
GENERAT1ONX (1998)); Harrison Sheppard, American Principles and the Evolving Ethos of
American LegalPractice, 28 LOY. U. Cm. L.J. 237,250 (1996) (noting "the erosion ofpublic
respect for lawyers and loss of confidence in our legal institutions"); Bradley A. Smith, Real
and Imagined Reform of Campaign Corruption, 6 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 141, 141
(1996) (remarking, based on survey data, that "public confidence in governmental institutions
continues to decline") (reviewing LARRY J. SABATO & GLENN R. SnIPsoN, DRTY LrrIE
SEcRETs: THE PERSISTENCE OF CORRUpIION N AmECAN PoLmTIcs (1996)). See generally
Leslie McAneny, Public Confidence in MajorInstitutions Little Changedfrom 1995 (Gallup
Poll, June 6, 1996) (on file with the Indiana Law Journal).
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where liability is imposed, upon the size or impact of the verdict.69 Concomitantly,
organizations such as the American Civil Liberties Union that normally might alert
the media to the constitutional dimensions of legal controversies seem, for whatever
reason, to be largely if not entirely absent from the picture.70 The result is that the
public appears to remain unaware of, and in turn unconcerned about, the significant
First Amendment principles implicated by the adjudication of certain tort actions
against religious defendants. Arguably it is not that the public might simply disagree
with the notion of a constitutional bar on tort actions; it is that the public does not see
the constitutional issue at the outset.7'
B. Institutional Factors
Having addressed the cultural factors that may both explain and precipitate a
movement towards initiating tort actions against religious entities, it is necessary to
address as well certain institutional factors that will affect the fate of such actions
once they enter the legal system, and specifically the judicial forum. For whatever
else may be said about this forum, from an institutional standpoint there is surely
69. See, e.g., Dallas Diocese Ordered To Pay $120 Million in Priest Sex Case, MJLw.
J.-SENTINB, July 25, 1997, atA8 (reporting that a suit against the Roman Catholic Diocese
of Dallas by former altar boys produced "the largest verdict of its kind"); SexualAbuse Claim
Leads to Auction at Church, MiLW. J.-SENTINEL, May 16, 1998, at A5 (reporting that the
Reedemer Lutheran Church of Duluth, Minnesota, "was forced to go to auction after the
Minnesota Supreme Court ordered the church to pay [a victim of pastoral sexual abuse] more
than $800,000 and the church's insurance company would pay only $215,000"). "
70. Indeed, the ACLU's stances in related cases indicates a potential insensitivity to such
issues. See, e.g., South Jersey Catholic Sch. Teachers Org. v. St. Teresa of the Infant Jesus
Church Elementary Sch., 696 A.2d 709, 714 (N.J. 1997) (noting the ACLU's position that
requiring a Diocese to bargain collectively would not violate the Diocese's liberty under the
Free Exercise Clause and would not cause excessive entanglement under the Establishment
Clause); Newport Church of the Nazarene v. Hensley, 983 P.2d 1072 (Or. CL App. 1999)
(reviewing a church-automony challenge to a state's inclusion of a minister within the
unemployment compensation system, in which the ACLU Foundation of Oregon sided not
with the church but with the claimant); cf. Scott C. Idleman, The Religious Freedom
Restoration Act: Pushing the Limits of Legislative Power, 73 TEX. L. REV. 247, 300 n.290
(1994) (noting "[t]he ACLU's tendency to advocate highly secularist and separationist
readings of the First Amendment").
71. In this respect, the bar is less like the school prayer rulings, of which the public
generally disapproves but to which the public seems not to deny there is a constitutional
dimension, and more like the flag desecration rulings, of which the public not only
disapproves but to which it often seems not to perceive a constitutional dimension at all. Even
many courts prior to Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989), and United States v. Eichman,
496 U.S. 310 (1990), both of which held that laws prohibiting flag desecration were
impermissibly content-based, did not conceptualize flag desecration as speech or its
prohibition as unconstitutionally censorious. See Eric Alan Isaacson, The FlagBurning Issue:
A Legal Analysis and Comment, 23 LoY. L.A. L. REv. 535, 549 n.98 (1990) (listing cases).
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nothing neutral about it. As with any other forum for resolution, the judicial branch
possesses its own institutional characteristics, which in turn affect the handling of
matters that come before it.72
Two such characteristics, one narrow and one broad, will be noted here. First is the
simple fact that most such actions are brought before state judges, not federal judges.
Because tie typical profile ofthese cases involves a plaintiff suing a defendant of the
same state under state tort law, the venue is virtually always a state court. At the risk
of reawakening the ever-awkward issue of federal-state judicial parity, however, this
fact should generate serious concern that (at least relative to federal court) the
influence of public attitudes and other cultural forces documented earlier may be
heightened and the sensitivity to the constitutional issues may be diminished.
The concern about relative public influence on state court decisionmaking is
longstanding and persists largely because of the electoral or political accountability
of most state judges in comparison to Article III federal judges, the latter of whom
enjoy life tenure and secure compensation.73 This is not to suggest that state courts
cannot or do not periodically render publicly or politically unpopular decisions.
Rather it is a matter of degree, one that may be significant in close cases where
external forces are strong.74 The other concern-diminished state court sensitivity to
constitutional issues-is somewhat more controversial because it questions the
competence of state judges above and beyond the institutionally determined trait of
72. See generally Jon 0. Newman, Between Legal Realism and Neutral Principles: The
Legitimacy of Institutional Values, 72 CAL. L. REv. 200,208-14 (1984) (discussing "values
that concern the judge's conception of the role of the courts and other sources of law, the
judge's view of the federal system, and the judge's informed sense of the process of
adjudication"). If there is "neutrality," particularly in relation to other anus of the
government, it inheres in the judicial obligation of impartiality. See, e.g., MODEL CODE OF
JUDICIAL CONDucT Canons 2B, 2C, 3A(1), 3C (1997). But this obligation does not reach
deeper cultural norms, such as those discussed in the previous Part, that may nevertheless
greatly influence the interpretation and application of legal principles.
73. See, e.g., Burt Neubome, The Myth of Parity, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1105, 1127-28
(1977); Martin H. Redish, Judicial Parity, Litigant Choice, and Democratic Theory: A
Comment on Federal Jurisdiction and Constitutional Rights, 36 UCLAL. REv. 329, 333-36
(1988); see also Donald H. Zeigler, Rights Require Remedies: A New Approach to the
Enforcement ofRights in the Federal Courts, 38 HASTINGS L.J. 665, 686 (1987) (noting that,
in comparison to federal judges, "[s]tate judges... may... be subject to majoritarian
political pressure").
74. See Neubome, supra note 73, at 1119-20 (suggesting that "given the institutional
differences between the two benches, state trial judges are less likely to resolve arguable
issues in favor of protecting federal constitutional rights than are their federal brethren"); see
also Susan N. Herman, Why Parity Matters, 71 B.U.L. REV. 651,654 (1991) (noting that the
Supreme Court has never actually stated that federal and state courts are truly equivalent to
one another, but has merely adopted a presumption that the latter are sufficient).
There is, to this author's knowledge, no clear, empirical evidence of this phenomenon
occurring in tort cases against religious entities. And certainly there are cases of this sort in
which state courts, on constitutional grounds, have ruled against adjudication. The claim,
rather, is an inferential one, taking into account all of the circumstances and forces affecting




accountability. It, too, should remain a genuine concern, however. As Professor Burt
Neubome recently argued, "in those areas of constitutional law where existing
Supreme Court doctrine holds open the chance of doctrinal growth,... a relative
institutional advantage for the... [constitutional claimant] exists in federal court;
an advantage resulting from a mix of political insulation, tradition, better resources
and superior professional competence."'7
As for tort actions against religious defendants, these concerns appear to be
justifiable indeed. Given the cultural context depicted above, the constitutional issues
raised in such actions are arguably the sort that would be at risk within an
institutional context that is relatively vulnerable to public and political pressures. 6
An examination of the case law, moreover, reveals that some state courts do seem to
view the adjudicability of such actions as a quasi-constitutional or prudential
matter-one that can permissibly vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, for
exampleT7-- rather than a bona fide constitutional issue generating serious First
75. Burt Neuborne, Parity Revisited: The Uses of a Judicial Forum of Excellence, 44
DEPAULL. REv. 797, 799 (1995) (footnote omitted); see also Zeigler, supra note 73, at 686
(noting that, in comparison to federaljudges, "[s]tatejudges are not uniformly well qualified"
and "may lack expertise in federal law"). But cf. Erwin Chemerinsky, Parity Reconsidered:
Defining a Role for the Federal Judiciary, 36 UCLA L. REV. 233, 302 (1988).
In a nation with fifty state court systems and ninety-one federal districts, it is
likely that some state courts will be superior to the federal courts in protecting
individual rights, while in other areas, the state courts will be inferior to the
federal judiciary. fi fact, in most areas, the courts probably vary depending on
the particular issue; a state court might be better in upholding some
constitutional rights, but worse as to others.
Id.; see also Solimine, supra note 67, at 1003 (arguing that "state supreme courts are dealing
with federal rights increasingly and responsibly").
76. Cf. Paul T. Hayden, Religiously Motivated "Outrageous" Conduct: Intentional
Infliction of Emotional Distress as a Weapon Against "Other People's Faiths", 34 Wk. &
MARtY L. REV. 579, 677 (1993) (noting that when a tort of intentional infliction of emotional
distress action "is brought by a plaintiff and the allegedly 'outrageous' conduct is religiously
motivated, an inevitable clash of values emerges: the communitarian values of tort law,
committed to enforcing societal norms of acceptability, versus the defendant's right to free
exercise of religion and society's strong interest in tolerating religious diversity").
77. In general, one's constitutional rights-such as incorporated Bill of Rights
liberties-are supposed to be relatively uniform amongjurisdictions. Cf. Drummond v. Fulton
County Dep't of Family & Children's Servs., 563 F.2d 1200, 1207 (5th Cir. 1977) (en banc)
(noting that "[t]rue liberty rights do not flow from state laws" but instead "have a more stable
source in our notions of intrinsic human rights"), cert. denied, 437 U.S. 910 (1978); Kit
Kinports, The Buck Does Not Stop Here: Supervisory Liability in Section 1983 Cases, 1997
U. ILL. L. REv. 147, 185 (remarking that "[t]he nature of a plaintiff's constitutional rights
should not vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction"). See generally Donald L. Beschle,
Uniformity in Constitutional Interpretation and the Background Right to Effective
Democratic Governance, 63 IND. L.J. 539 (1988). There are, however, at least two
exceptions. The first is when constitutionality turns inpart on community standards. See, e.g.,
Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973) (holding that whether expression is
constitutionally obscene is to be determined partly by the application of "contemporary
community standards"); Neil Coleman McCable, Legislative Facts as Evidence in State
Constitutional Search Analysis, 65 TEMP. L. REV. 1229, 1243-44 (1992) (addressing this
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Amendment concerns.7' That the issue is often raised essentially as a defense within
an ongoing, otherwise ordinary tort suit probably decreases the likelihood that these
constitutional concerns will be accorded full recognition and only serves to reinforce
in the judges' minds the propriety of employing their traditional case-by-case,
particularist method of analysis. 9 After all, viewed from a pure tort
perspective-especially given the goals of compensation and deterrence-there is
aspect of the obscenity test). The second is when constitutionality turns on legal categories,
such as property or contract, that are largely a matter of state definition. See, e.g., Lucas v.
South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1027-31 (1992) (holding that a regulation
that results in a total deprivation of economically beneficial use of one's property will give
rise to a compensable taking under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments unless the state can
demonstrate that the regulated activity would constitute a prohibitable nuisance under the
state's pre-existing law of property); Michael C. Blumm, Property Myths, JudicialActivism,
and the Lucas Case, 23 ENVTL L. 907,914-15 (1993) (addressing the potential for interstate
variation).
78. See C.J.C. v. Corporation ofthe Catholic Bishop, 985 P.2d 262, 278, 280-81 (Wash.
1999) (Madsen, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (criticizing the majority for
"fail[ing] to recognize the First Amendment implications of its decision" finding tort liability
and for "miss[ing] the constitutional dilemma"); Swanson v. Roman Catholic Bishop, 692
A.2d 441,444, 445 (Me. 1997) (concluding that some courts finding no First Amendment
problem with entertaining negligent supervision claims "have not fully addressed the
fundamental [constitutional] issue" and that courts allowing such claims to proceed where the
church had actual notice of risk "have failed to maintain the appropriate degree of neutrality
required by the United States... Constitution"). Examples from related contexts include
Konkle v. Henson, 672 N.E.2d 450, 456 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996). The court observed:
[W]ith regard to Konkle's claim under the doctrine of respondeat superior, the
Church Defendants cite no authority to support their contention that the First
Amendment prohibits such claims nor does our research reveal such authority.
Instead, courts apply traditional tortlawto the claims and determine whetherthe
ministerwas acting within the course and scope of his employment when the tort
occurred. Thus, we conclude that Konkle's respondeat superior claims are not
barred by the First Amendment.
Id.; see also Khmer Krom Buddhist Ass'n v. Nay, No. 21525-0-11, 1999 WL 257420, at *2
(Wash. CL App. Apr. 30, 1999) (Seinfeld, J., concurring) (noting in a property and contract
case the rule against doctrinal entanglement and contending that "the trial court strayed
impermissibly into doctrinal issues when it concluded that Buddhist law and tradition
'requires a panel of senior monks to preside over the issue of removal or replacement of the
Abbot or chiefmonk,"' but then deeming the violation "harmless" because it was unnecessary
to the trial court's legal conclusion), review denied, 138 Wash. 2d 1020 (Wash. 1999). In this
regard, it is interesting to note that at least one federal court expressly eschewed reliance on
state court decisions in favor of federal decisions. See Ayon v. Gourley, 47 F. Supp. 2d 1246,
1248 & n.1 (D. Colo. 1998) (noting that "caselaw from the state of Colorado on the First
Amendment does not constrain this Court in any way" and "[t]he fact that the Colorado state
courts have taken an extremely expansive view of the claims allowed against religious
organizations is not even particularly persuasive in light of the analysis by federal courts on
this issue" and that, "[]ikewise, the Court is not inclined to place any emphasis on any of the
many other state court cases cited by the parties"), af'd, 185 F.3d 873 (10th Cir. 1999).
79. See generally Frederick Schauer, Prediction and Particularity, 78 B.U. L. REv. 773,
786-87 (1998) (discussing the particularist approach of Jerome Frank).
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little about religious defendants indicating that their conduct should be outside of the
law's reach. And the fact that the general rule presently appears to be against
adjudicability does not mean that any given court will follow the rule, particularly
given the existence of contrary extrajurisdictional precedent for most tort causes of
action.8 1
80. See, e.g., Konkle, 672 N.E.2d at 456 (concluding, in a clergy sexual abuse case, that
the relevant conduct was secular, not religious). The court noted:
The protection of society requires that religious organizations be held
accountable for injuries they cause to third persons. Accordingly, we conclude
that Konlde's claim is not barred by the First Amendment. To hold otherwise
would be to extend the protections beyond that included within the First
Amendment and cloak churches with an absolute and exclusive immunity for
their actions.
Id.; see also F.G. v. MacDonell, 696 A.2d 697, 705 (N.J. 1997) ("In the sanctuary of the
church .... troubled parishioners should be able to seek pastoral counseling free from the fear
that the counselors will sexually abuse them. Our decision does no more than extend to the
defenseless the same protection that the dissent would extend to infants and incompetents.").
To the extent that churches are insured for the tortious conduct of their clergy, holding
churches liable might also advance the other primary tort goal of spreading or distributing
risks and losses. One problem with this logic, however, is the arguably attenuated relationship
between church revenue, on the one hand, and, on the other hand, the nature of the services
provided by churches as well as the beneficiaries ofthese services. See Eric William Cenyar,
The Checking Value ofFree Exercise: Religious Clashes with the State, 3 TEx. REV. L. & POL.
191,220 & n. 171 (1999) (contending that "[i]mposing unmitigated tort liability on religious
bodies punishes innocent believers and threatens their right to continued participation in the
worship and fellowship ofthat religious community" and noting Professor Douglas Laycock's
argument that "[tiort liability against religious organizations is vicarious in the extreme. The
loss falls on innocent believers who had nothing to do with the wrong, no opportunity to profit
from the wrong, and little or no opportunity to supervise or prevent the wrong." (quoting
Amicus Curiae Br. in Supp. of Granting Cert. at 9, International Soc'y for Krishna
Consciousness v. George, 499 U.S. 914 (1991))). But cf Eric A. Posner, The Regulation of
Groups: The Influence of Legal and Nonlegal Sanctions on Collective Action, 63 U. Cmr. L.
REv. 133, 143 (1996).
People join religious associations because the collectivity allows them to obtain
certain spiritual and material benefits that, even after subtracting cooperation
costs (for example, tithes and contributions), exceed the benefits that the
members could obtain alone. Religious associations scold, excommunicate, or
at least fail to praise people who miss services, commit sins, and violate rituals.
Id.
81. See, e.g., Doe v. Hartz, 52 F. Supp. 2d 1027, 1060-62 (N.D. Iowa 1999) (noting that
"there is a split in authority concerning whether and under what circumstances relationships
between members of the clergy or a diocese and an individual parishioner can give rise to an
actionable fiduciary duty" and consequently that "whether or not a breach-of-fiduciary-duty
claim can be asserted against a member of the clergy, a diocese, or a bishop is something of
an open question" and then proceeding to hold that such a claim is actionable). See generally
Clayton P. Gillette, Lock-In Effects in Law and Norms, 78 B.U. L. REV. 813, 824-25 (1998)
("Judicial decisions have characteristics ...that allow subsequent judges substantial
discretion in deciding whether to apply potential precedents. There may be multiple relevant
precedents, the selection of one of which leads to different results than if another selection
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That the legal decisionmakers in such cases are state judges is, however, only the
first and narrower point worth noting. The second and broader point is that they are
judges at all. Again, institutionally speaking there is nothing neutral about- the
judicial system, and placing a dispute within its parameters necessarily means that
the dispute's resolution will vary according to the institutional peculiarities of that
system. What makes this a relevant consideration is that judges, as a group, when
faced with a dispute pitting religious interests against governmental or secular
interests, generally seem inclined towards devaluing the former while concomitantly
overstating the latter.
Though potentially controversial, this hypothesis derives support from both
empirical and theoretical bases. The empirical basis is simply the poor track record
of religions freedom claims presented to courts, 2 which is partly the result of
apparent judicial distortion of the free exercise analysis in ways that hinder the
claimant 3 (Of course, this argument is somewhat weakened by the fact that a
is made from the same plausible set."). If precedent were unavailable, ajudge could certainly
find support from the legal academy, some members of which seem also to have difficulty
fully appreciating the gravity of the constitutional issues at stake. See, e.g., Villiers, supra
note 61, at 4.
The doctrine of separation of church and state does not relieve the state of its
responsibility to protect its citizens from harm when clergy are engaged in
nonreligious activities. If women do not get redress for these wrongs, they are
victimized repeatedly, first by the clergy and then by the legal system. To correct
this manifest injustice, the courts must acknowledge the balance envisioned by
the Framers of the Constitution, where an equally powerful state and church
coexist. This balance is not upset by recognition of the clergy malpractice action.
Id.; see also id. at 52-63 (setting forth a fuller but no less aggressive constitutional analysis).
82. See Douglas W. Kmiec, The Original Understanding of the Free Exercise Clause and
Religious Diversity, 59 UMKC L. REV. 591, 596 (1991) (noting in terms of Supreme Court
cases that "[e]xcept for the unemployment compensation cases and the cases allowing Amish
parents to keep their children out of public school after eighth grade, claims for religious
exemptions were largely unsuccessful") (footnote omitted); James E. Ryan, Note, Smith and
the Religious Freedom Restoration Act: An Iconoclastic Assessment, 78 VA. L. REv. 1407,
1412 (1992) (concluding that "the decisions in the United States courts of appeals over the
ten years preceding Smith reveals that, despite the apparent protection afforded claimants by
the language ofthe compelling interest test, courts overwhelmingly sided withthe government
when applying that test"). Codifying religious freedom seems not to improve the odds. See Ira
C. Lupu, The Failure of RFRA, 20 U. ARK. LrTE RocK L.J. 575, 585 (1998) (concluding
that the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, which statutorily reinstated strict scrutiny after
Smith, "failed to produce any substantial improvement in the legal atmosphere surrounding
religious liberty in the United States").
83. When strict scrutiny is employed in free exercise cases, for example, the range of
government interests that qualify as "compelling" appears to be much broader than in other
constitutional contexts, such as free speech or equal protection, where strict scrutiny is also
employed. See Marci A. Hamilton, The Belief/ConductParadigm in the Supreme Court's Free
Exercise Jurisprudence: A TheologicalAccount of the Failure To ProtectReligious Conduct,
54 Omo ST. L.J. 713,751-54 (1993); Idleman, supra note 70, at 279 & n. 159. But cf. Eugene
Volokh, A Common-Law Model for Religious Exemptions, 46 UCLA L. REv. 1465, 1498-
1500 (1999) (arguing that this apparent differential reflects not an inconsistency in the
definition of compelling interests, but rather the inherent differences between religiously
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number of courts, at least to date, have barred suits against religious defendants on
constitutional grounds.) The theoretical basis has at least two components. First,
judges (particularly appellate judges) comprise a rather elite class who may have
difficulty relating to the claims of the religiously devout, whether in general or in the
specific case of religious entities defending against tort actions.84 This difficulty may
reflect their own diminished religious devoutness, or it may result from a heightened
commitment to empirical, rationalist modes of knowledge and discourse to which
religious devoutness may seem foreign.8
motivated conduct and, for example, speech); Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech,
Permissible Tailoring, and Transcending Strict Scrutiny, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2417,2451-52
(1996) (noting this disjunction and offering possible explanations).
84. See, e.g., E. Gregory Wallace, When Government Speaks Religiously, 21 FLA. ST. U.
L. REv. 1183, 1221 n. 188 (1994) ("In many instances .... judges may more closely represent
society's secularized intellectual elite than the general population. If that is true, they would
more likely assume the view of the nonreligious or antireligious outsider rather than the view
of one who belongs to a religious minority."); Lupu, supra note 82, at 593 (arguing that
judicial discomfort with claims of religious exemption could be attributable in part to the fact
that "judges, drawn from America's highly educated elite, may be skeptical about intensely
held religious commitments"); Michael W. McConnell, Religious Freedom at a Crossroads,
59 U. CuH. L. REv. 115, 126 (1992).
In its attitude toward religion, the [Supreme] Court may typify the gulf between
a largely secularized professional and academic elite and most ordinary citizens,
for whom religion commonly remains a central aspect of life. How many of the
Justices and their clerks have had personal experience with serious
religion-religion understood as more than ceremony, as the guiding principle
of life? How many have close friends or associates who have had such
experiences? For those who have lived their lives among academics and
professionals, it may be difficult to understand why believers attach so much
importance to things that seem so inconsequential.
Id. (footnotes omitted); see also Stephen L. Carter, Introduction to Faith and the Law
Symposium, 27 TEX. TEcH L. REv. 925, 929 (1996) (arguing, in regard to the question ofhow
conflicts between religious dictates and civil law should be resolved, that "secular law has
lately preferred to pretend that the question does not exist-or rather, that the answer is
obvious. Of course one's first allegiance is to the secular sovereign; of course the laws of that
secular sovereign trump any religious principles with which they come into contact; of course
reasonable religious people understand this hierarchy and abide by it. Anybody who believes
anything else, we dismiss as a fanatic."); Idleman, supra note 70, at 255-57 & nn.31-38
(discussing elite discomfort with religious devoutness). Regarding the elitism of judges,
especially Supreme Court Justices, see generally George W. Dent, Jr., Secularism and the
Supreme Court, 1999 BYUL. REV. 1, 54-58; A.C. Pritchard & Todd J. Zywicki, Finding the
Constitution: An Economic Analysis of Tradition's Role in Constitutional Interpretation, 77
N.C. L. REv. 409, 498-500 (1999).
85. See STEPHEN L. CARTER, THE DISSENT OF THE GOVERNED: A MEDrTATION ON LAW,
RELIGION, AND LOYALTY 104-05 (1998) (addressing "the difficulty that judges have in
accepting the religious world view as one that can possibly guide a just and sensible citizen,
and the consequent judicial intolerance of the disobedience that religion sometimes makes
necessary"); Gedicks, supra note 2, at 141 (noting that judges operate within "a culture that
generally values rationalism over the nonrational ways of knowing, understanding, and living
that characterize much of religious life"); Paul Horwitz, The Sources andLimits ofFreedom
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Second and relatedly, judges tend by nature to be relatively statist: 'ypically,
elected and appointed judges share a common perspective in which the preservation
of order is central to their administration."' Accordingly, judges tend to balk at the
notion that the governing law-and, in turn, their jurisdiction-might somehow be
constrained by factors extraneous to the law itselfY Hence the Supreme Court's
proclamation in Employment Division v. Smith' that
ofReligion in a Liberal Democracy: Section 2(a) andBeyond, 54 U. ToRoNTo FAC. L. REV.
1, 5 (1996) ("To the degree thatthe state bases its decisions on a rational, liberal framework,
the qualities that make religion unique and valuable-its allegiance to the irrational and the
supernatural-will cause religious goals to be subordinated to statist goals.") (footnote
omitted). This is not to suggest that legislators or administrators are necessarily more
amenable than judges to the claims of the religiously devout. See Thomas C. Berg, Religion
Clause Anti-Theories, 72 NoTRE DAME L. REv. 693, 749 (1997).
A critic especially concerned about secularist assumptions might warn that
judges will always be drawn from the relatively secularized elite, while
legislators and bureaucrats are forced institutionally to listen to-and are more
likely to be drawn from-the more religious classes of society (at least the more
numerous faiths). But to the extent that there was such a difference between
judges and other decisionmakers, it probably has shrunk a considerable amount
Many ofthe most important decisionmakers on issues ofreligion and public life,
especially those involving the public schools, are bureaucrats who have
themselves been professionally socialized to be hostile to active, public religion.
At the very least, they are so committed to their programs asto be unsympathetic
about their effects on religious freedom.
Id.
86. J. Thomas Sullivan, Requiem for RFRA: A Philosophical and Political Response, 20
U. Anx. LrnrLE ROCK L.J. 795, 798 (1998) ("This perspective often predominates over their
philosophical and political views, so that liberals and conservatives alike tend to share a
common belief in the need for social stability reflected in orderly governmental process.").
87. See id. (commenting that "judges are the instruments of secular institutions,
committed to furthering an agenda central to secularly-determined values-for example,
commitment to the 'rule of law,'as opposed to the 'rule of God"'); see also CARTER, supra
note 85, at 105.
[T1he courts are part of the government They are... not a check on the
sovereign but apart of the sovereign .... So all the fine talk about "judicial
review" as a way to test the actions of a thing called "the government" or "the
state" against another thing called "the Constitution' is often little more than
that fine talk.... [A]t the end of the day, the branches of government...
all... share an interest in the survival of constituted authority.
Id. (emphasis in original) "[Tihejudicial concern for disobedience is not a concern only about
the edicts of the courts. Judges, as part of the sovereign, view with displeasure any efforts to
thwart the sovereign's will, unless the defendants are able to convince the judges that their
efforts are in furtherance of a higher constitutional goal." Id. at 114 (emphasis in original);
see also Craig Anthony Arnold, Religious Freedom as a Civil Rights Struggle, NExus, Fall
1997, at 149, 159-60 ("in general,. . .forced compliance with government regulation may be
purposeful and rational from a government's viewpoint: it fears that the faithful have
abandoned some sort of social contract for some form of religious covenant, and it must
reassert the primacy of the social contract, civil government").
88. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
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[t]he government's ability to enforce generally applicable prohibitions of socially
harmful conduct, like its ability to carry out other aspects ofpublic policy, "cannot
depend on measuring the effects of a governmental action on a religious
objector's spiritual development" To make an individual's obligation to obey
such a law contingent upon the law's coincidence with his religious beliefs,
except where the State's interest is "compelling"--permitting him, by virtue of
his beliefs, 'to become a law unto himself,'--contradicts both constitutional
tradition and common sense.'
In short, the fact that the adjudicability of tort claims against religious entities is
largely a judicial matter, and more specifically a state judicial matter, does not
necessarily portend a bright future for the current limitation on such actions,
especially in light of various cultural developments. Given these considerations, in
fact, it is somewhat surprising that so many courts to date have been willing to
countenance the nonadjudication of various tort actions against religious defendants.
C. Doctrinal and Theoretical Factors
Compounding both the cultural and institutional phenomena thus far mentioned
are certain features of current religion jurisprudence under the First Amendment.
Three such features willbe addressed here: a doctrinal shift towards formal neutrality
under both religion clauses (accompanied by an apparent theoretical loss of the First
Amendment's religious foundations); the lack of an adequate constitutional
grounding, in doctrine or theory, of the existing bar on adjudicating tort disputes
against religious entities (or, for that matter, the more general prohibition on
adjudicating religious questions); and, lastly, a potential disfavoritism towards
viewing religious liberty in institutional terms.
First and most importantly, the Supreme Court in recent years has consistently
recalibrated its jurisprudential conception of "neutrality" essentially to mean
equality-of-treatment between religion and nonreligion. ° Thus, according to this
revised view, the Free Exercise Clause should generally not be read to require
accommodation for religious practices where such accommodation would not be
required or is not provided for nonreligious practices,9 while the Establishment
89. Id. at 885 (quoting Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S.
439, 451 (1988), and Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. (8 Otto) 145, 167 (1878),
respectively); see also Hamilton, supra note 83, at 789 & n.451 (discussing the influence of
considerations of "law and order" on the Supreme Court's free exercise doctrine).
90. See, e.g., Daniel 0. Conkle, The Path of American Religious Liberty: From the
Original Theology to Formal Neutrality and an Uncertain Future, 75 IND. L.J. 1,16-24
(2000); Dhananjai Shivakumar, Neutrality and the Religion Clauses, 33 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L.
Rnv. 505, 506-23 (1998). Professor Michael McConnell has noted that the Smith Court's
retention of a discretionary accommodation doctrine, despite its general repudiation of a
mandatory accommodation doctrine, is not consistent with a pure model of formal neutrality,
which "would make unconstitutional all legislation that explicitly exempts religious
institutions or individuals from generally applicable burdeng or obligations." McConnell,
supra note 84, at 166-67.
91. See, e.g., Smith, 494 U.S. 872. Correspondingly, when alawthat sufficiently burdens
religious beliefs or practices provides for one or more nonreligious exemptions but not a
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Clause should generally not be read to prohibit support to religion (at a widely
diffused level) where such support is also provided to nonreligion.9 In other words,
"current religion clause doctrine is being 'normalized' wherein the doctrines
governing religion-government relations are "[n]o longer constitutionally
distinct .... ,,I Whatever the causes of this shift, 9 and however much it might be
religious exemption, it may be subject to strict scrutiny. See id. at 883-84 (discussing
unemployment compensation cases); Fraternal Order of Police, Newark Lodge No. 12 v. City
of Newark, 170 F.3d 359, 365 (3d Cir.) (mandating religious exemption from police
department no-beard policy because "the Department's decision to provide medical
exemptions while refusing religious exemptions is sufficiently suggestive of discriminatory
intent so as to trigger heightened scrutiny"), cert. denied, 120 S. Ct. 56 (1999); cf Church of
the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 543 (1993) (invalidating
municipal ordinances prohibiting ritualistic animal slaughter, which contained several
nonreligious exemptions, because they were neither neutral nor generally applicable; the
ordinances' "underinclusion" was "substantial, not inconsequential"). The anomaly is the
Smith Court's hybrid rights concept, whereby strict scrutiny may be triggered when a free
exercise claim is asserted in tandem with another constitutional right. Smith, 494 U.S. at
881-82.
92. This includes not only financial support, but also public resources in general, such as
use of government property and services. See, e.g., Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203 (1997);
Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819 (1995); Capital Square
Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753 (1995); Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch.
Dist, 509 U.S. 1 (1993); Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S.
384 (1993); see also Frederick Mark Gedicks, The Improbability ofReligion Clause Theory,
27 SETON HALLL. RLV. 1233, 1236 (1997).
Instead of being subject to special restrictions in competing for government
recognition and financial assistance, religious individuals and groups (with the
important exception of parochial schools) are increasingly treated like their
secular counterparts, constitutionally entitledto receive the same recognition and
assistance as is available to secular organizations. Instead of being uniquely
exempt fromthe obligation to obey the law, religious practice receives onlywhat
other constitutionally protected freedoms receive-the promise that government
cannot consciously discriminate against it.
Id.
Forrecent state court decisions in the school voucher context, compare Jackson v. Benson,
578 N.W.2d 602 (Wis. 1998) (upholding aWisconsinlawproviding for educational vouchers,
even if used substantially at religious schools, in part because the law is facially neutral
betweenreligious and nonreligious schools), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct 466 (1998), withBagley
v. Raymond Sch. Dep't, 728 A.2d 127 (Me.) (holding that a Maine law expressly excluding
religious schools from receiving state funds does not, despite a lack offacial neutrality, violate
the Free Exercise, Establishment, or Equal Protection Clauses), cert. denied, 120 S. Ct 364
(1999).
93. Gedicks, supra note 92, at 1236.
Certainly one way to ensure that the governmentis genuinely neutral as between
religion and non-religion-to ensure, that is, that the level of religious activity
in American society is the result of individual choices unaffected by
governmental encouragement or discouragement-is precisely to normalize the
constitutional law ofreigion. Normalizationis achieved by requiring constraints
on religion under the Establishment Clause only when such constraints would
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applauded by those who condone government aid to religion, it almost certainly
presents a challenge to the extant differential treatment of tort actions against
religions defendants. Superficially, at least, the "neutral" approach would now entail
subjecting such defendants and their conduct to the same adjudicatory processes as
their nonreligious counterparts,' a prospect that has already been partly realized by
the Court's embrace of the "neutral principles of law" approach to resolving church
property cases and, in turn, by the lower court utilization of that approach to resolve
tort suits against religious defendants.'
This normalization of religion clause doctrine and the resulting inconsistency of
barring tort actions against religious defendants are only reinforced by the strong
jurisprudential commitment to equal treatment as found both in constitutional law'
and our more general legal traditions.9" Whether one focuses on the victims of
also be imposed on analogous secular activities, and by affording protection to
religious practice under the Free Exercise Clause only when such protection is
given to analogous secular activities.
Id. at 1257.
94. Professor Gedicks, for one, argues that this "[n]ormalization is a natural doctrinal
manifestation of the Court's commitment to secular individualism." Id. at 1257. See also
Conkle, supra note 90, at 32-35.
95. See, e.g., Lightman v. Flaum, 687 N.Y.S.2d 562, 569, 570 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1999)
(holding that the plaintiff could pursue a claim against her rabbi for breach of the
clergy-penitent privilege in part because "there is no compelling reason here to shield these
Rabbis from liability in tort for revealing such sensitive, personal communications, when
other similarly situated professionals are subject to potential liability under statutory
provisions analogous in scope and purpose to that at issue here" and because a contrary rule
under the facts of the case "would improperly and unwisely create a standard for these
defendants, as Orthodox Rabbis, different from that followed by the rest of society").
96. See Ira C. Lupu, Free Exercise Exemption and Religious Institutions: The Case of
Employment Discrimination, 67 B.U. L. REv. 391, 404-08 (1987) (arguing that the neutral
principles approach may undercut the doctrine of church autonomy); infra text accompanying
notes 115-18 (discussing the case law). Of course, whether the "neutral principles of law"
approach ultimately restricts the general prohibition, or ultimately serves to reinforce it, will
depend substantially on the reach of the neutrality requirement If neutrality means nothing
more than defined without particular regard to religion, then many doctrines of tort law will
be deemed neutral and, thus, applicable. If, however, it also means appliedwithout particular
regard to religion, then, as discussed earlier, those doctrines of tort law that necessitate
reliance on or inquiry into religious doctrine or norms may very well fail the neutrality test.
Many thanks to Professor Eugene Volokh for raising this point.
97. See, e.g., Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 633 (1996) ("Central both to the idea of the
rule of law and to our own Constitution's guarantee of equal protection is the principle that
government and each of its parts remain open on impartial terms to all who seek its
assistance."); Conlde, supra note 90, at 5-24.
98. See, e.g., Evan H. Caminker, Precedent andPrediction: The Forward-LookingAspects
of Inferior Court Decisionmaking, 73 Tax. L. REV. 1, 39 (1994) (noting that the principle
"that similarly situated litigants are treated equally... is considered a hallmark of fairness
in a regime committed to the rule of law"). Additionally, as suggested supra text
accompanying note 80, it might also be observed that the traditional goals of tort law, such
as compensation and deterrence, are obviously disserved as well by the nonadjudication of
suits against religious defendants, constitutional considerations notwithstanding.
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religious tortfeasors or on the religious tortfeasors themselves, when claims against
such tortfeasors are barred, the appearance is one of unequal treatment by the legal
system. It is true, of course, that the free exercise doctrine of accommodation itself
may raise this concern." The difference here, however, is that the plaintiff is not
being disallowed a benefit accorded only to some citizens, but rather is effectively
being deprived of a right-the redressability of tortious injury-that is otherwise
enjoyed by every citizen."° Arguably, the Court's recent reconstruction of neutrality
as equality is intended to preclude this very type of differential legal treatment insofar
as it results from privileging religion in a substantively unique way."'
What makes this jurisprudential shift even more profound is that the extant
limitation on tort suits against religious defendants is itself inadequately grounded
from a constitutional standpoint, thus leaving it vulnerable to modification or even
elimination. As the Smith case amply demonstrated, doctrines that lack solid
theoretical footing can be highly susceptible to revisionism, even where the
precedents are relatively clear and not of particularly recent vintage." Yet, as one
99. See Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 885 (1990) (stating that a doctrine of
mandatory accommodation "contradicts both constitutional tradition and common sense");
FrederickMark Gedicks, The Normalized FreeExercise Clause: ThreeAbnormalities, 75 IND.
L.J. 77 (2000); Frederick Mark Gedicks, An Unfirm Foundation: The Regrettable
Indefensibility of Religious Exemptions, 20 U. AK. LX RocK L.J. 555, 570-71 (1998)
(noting that uniquely favorable treatment ofreligion, inthe form of free exercise exemptions,
does not necessarily sit well with "a society committed to individual equality"); Perry Dane,
Note, Religious Exemptions Under the Free Exercise Clause: A Model of Competing
Authorities, 90 YALE L.J. 350, 356 (1980) (arguing that religion-based exemptions are
vulnerable, among other things, to the objection that they "contradict the rule of law").
100. Additionally, religious institutions themselves may have an interest in not overly
asserting the bar on adjudicating religious questions, lest they, too, might be unable to utilize
the legal system. See, e.g., Maktab Tarighe Oveyssi Shah Maghsoudi, Inc. v. Kianfar, 179
F.3d 1244,1248 (9th Cir. 1999) ("[W]e must be carefullnot to deprive religious organizations
of all recourse to the protections of civil law that are available to all others. Such a
deprivation would raise its own serious problems under the Free Exercise Clause. It would
also leave religious organizations at the mercy of anyone who appropriated their propertywith
an assertion of religious right to it") (citation omitted); Chittenden v. Waterbury Ctr.
Community Church, Inc., 726 A-2d 20, 26-27 (Vt 1998) (noting in a property case that "if
a court's analysis and decision-making constituted 'excessive government entanglement' then
religious institutions would never have recourse in court as to any dispute in which their
religious status was in issue"); cf. Encore Prods., Inc. v. Promise Keepers, 53 F. Supp. 2d
1101, 1113 (Colo. 1999) (deciding to enforce a religiously-based arbitration agreement,
despite potential entanglement concerns, in part because the court's refusal to do so could
"creat[e] ... an unjust bias against religion, thereby depriving [a party] of its free exercise
rights").
101. But see Gibson v. Brewer, 952 S.W.2d 239, 247-48 (Mo. 1997) (enbanc) (treating the
nonrecognition of a cause of action for negligent supervision as a permissible accommodation
that does not violate the Establishment Clause).
102. See Idleman, supra note 70, at 291 (arguing that "a failure to articulate the underlying
principles and rationales for religious liberty... is one reason that Justice Scalia could so
easily rearrange free exercise doctrine in Smith"); see also supra note 53 (noting as well the
Court's revision of the its abortion jurisprudence, which, as articulated in Roe v. Wade, 410
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state supreme court justice (now chief justice) notes in regard to tort suits against
religious defendants, "[it is generally acknowledged that this area of First
Amendment law is in flux and the United States Supreme Court cases offer very
limited guidance.""0 3 This lack of guidance is evident not only by the splits of
authority among the nation's jurisdictions, but even more fundamentally by the lack
of consensus about which clause of the First Amendment undergirds the
inadjudicability of such suits.' (So nonuniform are the rulings in this area that it is
difficult even to imagine that it is genuinely a matter of constitutional law, although
it is true that many areas of constitutional jurisprudence do, from time to time, fall
into a state of doctrinal disarray.) Unfortunately, the foundationless nature of the
prohibition on adjudicating religious questions finds no refuge or alleviation in the
more general jurisprudence of the religion clauses. For the Court's religion cases as
a whole are themselves devoid of theoretical depth,105 a problem that some have
suggested may have no apparent resolution.0 6
A final characteristic of First Amendment doctrine adverse to the continued
protection of religious entities against tort actions is an apparent disfavoritism, found
in judicial decisions and reflective of the larger culture, towards conceptualizing
religious liberty in institutional terms. While there is much debate over the proper
scope of protection for individual free exercise, few if any observers have difficulty
locating individual free exercise itself within the ambit of the First Amendment
From the outset however, the Court (for one) has not so readily recognized a strong
U.S. 113 (1973), is widely recognized as having lacked meaningful constitutional grounding
from the standpoint of theory or principle).
103. Pritzlaff v. Archdiocese of Milwaukee, 533 N.W.2d 780, 794 (Wis. 1995)
(Abrahamson, J., dissenting); see also Swanson v. Roman Catholic Bishop of Portland, 692
A.2d 441,446-47 (Me. 1997) (Lipez, J., dissenting) (remarking that this is "an area ofthe law
in which the U.S. Supreme Court cases offer limited guidance and there remains significant
doctrinal uncertainty").
104. See supra text accompanying notes 16-20. This is largely the fault of the Supreme
Court, which has never fully explained or justified the general limitation on adjudicating
religious questions or the specific limitation on deferring to religious institutional decisions.
See Angela C. Carmella, Houses of Worship andReligious Liberty: Constitutional Limits to
Landmark Preservation and Architectural Review, 36 VILL. L. REV. 401, 416-17 (1991)
(noting the Court's lack of guidance in the intrachurch dispute cases).
105. See, e.g., William P. Marshall, What Is the Matter with Equality?, 75 IND. L.J. 193,
194-96 (2000); William P. Marshall, Truth and the Religion Clauses, 43 DEPAUL L. REV.
243, 243 (1994) (arguing that "[t]here is little agreement as to what values underlie the
Religion Clauses of the First Amendment" and that religion clause jurisprudence is
"perceived as shallow, inconsistent, and nonpersuasive").
106. See, e.g., FREDERiCK MARK GEDICKS, THE RHETORIC OF CHURCH AND STATE: A
CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF RELGION CLAUSE JURIsPRUDENCE (1995); STEvEN D. SMrH,
FOREORDAINED FAILURE: THE QUEST FOR A CONSTITUTIONAL PRINCIPLE OF RELIGIOUS
FREEDOM (1995); Gedicks, supra note 92. But see Berg, supra note 85 (responding to
Professors Smith and Gedicks and proposing a theory grounded in religious voluntarism);
David E. Steinberg, Gardening at Night: Religion and Choice, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 987,
1015 (1999) (reviewing SMrH, supra) (responding to Professor Smith and arguing that "the
religion clauses were intended to protect and promote religious choice").
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relationship between free exercise and institutionalized religion, 117 although the
church property cases-when understood as free exercise cases-are an exception.
More importantly, there is arguably within American culture a general discomfort
with according preferred legal status or heightened protection to institutionalized
religion, perhaps traceable to certain strands of Protestant theology,'0 8 to a distrust
of group self-definition and communal disassociation,' 9 to a related concern about
107. See, e.g., Glendon & Yanes, supra note 1, at 489, 495-96 (noting that the Court's
decisions, beginning in the late 1940s and early 1950s, "constru[ed] the free exercise
provision as mainly protecting individual rights, largely ignoring its associational and
institutional dimensions" and firther noting, in regard to Sherbert and Schempp, that the
Court's "individualistic construction offree exercise backed up by a 'compelling interest' test
discouraged government from interfering with the religious rights of solitary individuals, but
ignored the associational aspects of free exercise"); see also Gedicks, supra note 92, at 1241.
With Everson, the Supreme Court abandoned religious communitarianism as a
normative guide to church-state relations, in favor of secular individualism.
Although governmental neutrality among particular Protestant sects was
consistentwith religious communitarianism, suchneutrality between Protestants
and non-Protestants and between believers and nonbelievers was antithetical to
it Likewise, although the institutional separation of church and state was
consistent with the religious communitarianism, the more decisive cultural and
political division implied by the 'wall of separation' was not
Id.; see Phillip E. Johnson, Afterword, NEXUS, Fall 1997, at 169, 171.
ITihe disagreement [among Supreme Court Justices] over the desirability of
religious exemptions cannotbe explained by any simplistic 'pro-or-anti-religion'
formula. What does help to explain the lineup is that political liberals tend to be
indulgent towards harmless individuals and small groups who have quaint
beliefs, while being intensely suspicious of "organized religion"-meaning
groups like the Catholic Church and evangelical Protestants, who might
challenge the liberal hegemony.
Id.
108. See, e.g., Steven D. Smith, Separation and the Fanatic, 85 VA. L. REv. 213, 234-38
(1999) (reviewing TImoTHY L. HALL, SEPARATING CHURCH AND STATE: ROGER WILIAMs
AND REuGIOUS LIBERTY (1998)) (relating Roger Williams's spiritual-temporal disjunction
to individual religious isolationism and "[t]he cultural and spiritual fragmentation associated
with separation"). See generally Edward J. Eberle, Roger Williams' Gift: Religious Freedom
in America, 4 ROGER W LIAMS U. L. REV. 425 (1999).
109. See Gedicks, supra note 2, at 141.
A decision in favor of religious group self-definition requires that a judge labor
againstthe combined forces of a political systeminwhichgovernmentregulation
and individual rights talk are both commonplace, and a culture that generally
values rationalism over the nonrational ways of knowing, understanding, and
living that characterize much of religious life.
Id.; see also Michael W. McConnell, "God Is Dead and We Have Killed Him!": Freedom of
Religion in thePost-Modern Age, 1993 BYUL. REV. 163, 173 (observing that"[a] liberalism
based on individualism, independence, and rationalism.., has a tendency to see traditional
religion as authoritarian, irrational, and divisive-as a potential threat to our democratic
institutions"). For recent academic efforts to reconcile communal disassociation with
constitutional doctrine and liberal philosophical principles, see generally Abner S. Greene,
Kiryas Joel and Two Mistakes About Equality, 96 COLUM. L. REv. 1 (1996), Mark D. Rosen,
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protecting the sovereignty of civil government,"0 or to latent or lingering
anti-Catholicism."'
Of course, it is questionable whether, as a matter of constitutional principle, the
First Amendment could actually be interpreted tO exclude institutional claims,
particularly those seeking accommodation." 2 But this does not meanthat such claims
must be, or will be, given the same level of solicitude as individual claims, possibly
reflecting the relative political influence ofinstitutions versus individuals.' 13 Nor does
The OuterLimits ofCommunity Self-Governance in ResidentialAssociations, Municipalities,
and Indian Country: A Liberal Theory, 84 VA. L. REv. 1053 (1998).
110. See, e.g., Stephen L. Carter, The Supreme Court, 1992 Term-Comment: The
Resurrection ofReligious Freedom?, 107 I-IAIRV. L. REV. 118, 138 (1992) ("The religionist,
citing the sovereignty of religious tradition, will sometimes say to the secular state, 'I refuse
to do as you command, because I answer to a higher authority.' This is a radically
destabilizing proposition. . . ."); Sanford Levinson, Constituting Communities Through
Words That Bind: Reflections on Loyalty Oaths, 84 MIcH. L. REV. 1440, 1467 (1986).
[R]eligiorn ... makes obvious claims of sovereignty as against other social
institutions. A staple of political theory following the development of the notion
of political sovereignty by Bodin is that there cannot be two sovereigns within
a polity. By definition sovereignty is an exclusive status. Yet anyone who takes
(at least Western) religion seriously poses an alternative sovereign against the
claims of the State, however much the claims are dissipated by doctrines like the
Talmudic injunction to follow the local law or by Christian doctrines about God
and Caesar.
Id. (footnote omitted).
The concern about the competing sovereignnature ofreligionis by no means limited to claims
of institutional free exercise, as opposed to claims of individual free exercise, but the
dimension of institutionalization probably enhances or exacerbates this concern. See CARTER,
supra note 85, at 62 ("America's legally constituted sovereigns have generally been less kind
to dissenting groups than to dissenting individuals, perhaps because the one is more
dangerous than the other.").
111. See generally Edward McGlynn Gaffney, Jr., Hostility to Religion, American Style,
42 DEPAULL. REv. 263, 279-92 (1992) (cataloguing the history and persistence ofnAmerican
anti-Catholicism); Douglas Laycock, A Survey of Religious Liberty in the United States, 47
OHIO ST. L.J. 409, 417-18 (1986) (likewise providing examples of how "Roman Catholics
have experienced hostility throughout our history").
112. Compare Garrett Epps, What We TalkAbout When We TalkAbout Free Exercise, 30
ARiz. ST. L.J. 563, 593 (1998) ("There are certainly no grounds to argue that free exercise
protects only individual claims."), with Lupu, supra note 96, at 422-27 (arguing that
institutional free exercise accommodation claims are indefensible).
113. See Epps, supra note 112, at 594.
[T]here is no a priori reason why a court could not factor into its analysis the
degree to which the organizational claimant has access to political influence; this
analysis would not differ conceptually from the Court's established practice of
employing more probing scrutiny when examining laws that restrict the rights
of "discrete and insular minorities" than when adjudicating equal protection
challenges to laws affecting larger or more influential groups within the political
process.
Id. (emphasis in original) (footnote omitted) (quoting United States v. Carolene Prods. Co.,
304 U.S. 144, 153 n.4 (1938)).
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it mean that the judiciary cannot adopt certain tests or doctrines that institutional
claimants, incomparisonto individual claimants, mayfind more difficult to satisfy."4
And, in all events, it does not mean that the judiciary will not increasingly be
influenced by the cultural forces and doctrinal trends noted earlier, which, when
combined with this potential disposition against unduly protecting let alone
privileging institutional religion, may notbode well for the continued existence ofthe
bar on tort actions against institutional religious defendants.
I. THE FORM OF ITS DEMISE
Because the First Amendment obstacles to adjudicating tort claims against
religious defendants cannot in principle be ignored outright, courts seeking to
overcome these obstacles must rely upon or develop various exceptions to the First
Amendment's application. This Part ofthe Article shall discuss several suchpotential
exceptions, all of which are drawn from existing cases. As the discussion will note,
however, the legitimacy of many ofthese exceptions or the manner in which they are
applied is questionable; some, in fact, are not so much exceptions to the general
prolibition as they are partial abrogations of it.
The most widely invoked exception involves the so-called neutral principles
method, which allows the adjudication of religious institutional disputes when they
can be resolved according to "neutral principles of law," that is, legal rules or
standards that have been developed and are regularly applied in a given field of law
without particular regard to religious institutions or doctrines." 5 According to the
That said, there are examples outside of the traditional tort context in which institutional
free exercise is protected in ways that individual free exercise is not. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. §
2000e-l (a) (1994) (providing exemption from Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, which
otherwise prohibits religious discrimination, any "religious corporation, association,
educational institution, or societywithrespectto the employment ofindividuals ofaparticular
religion to perform work connected with the carrying on by such corporation, association,
educational institution, or society of its activities"); id. § 2000e-2(eX2) (similarly allowing
religious educational institutions, under certain conditions, "to hire and employ employees
ofa particular religion"); cf id. § 2000e-2(eX1) (allowing any employer to hire "on the basis
of his religion, sex, or national origin in those certain instances where religion, sex, or
national origin is a bona fide occupational qualification reasonably necessary to the normal
operation of that particular business or enterprise").
114. See Ira C. Lupu, Where Rights Begin: The Problem ofBurdens on the Free Exercise
of Religion, 102 HARV. L. REV. 933, 955 (1989) ("[T]o the extent that sincerity requires a
demonstration of heart-felt commitment, rather than the less demanding qualities of
credibility or authenticity, sincerity as a free exercise element may also be marked by a bias
in favor of individual over institutional forms ofreligion.").
115. See Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595, 602-04 (1979) (discussing the neutral principles
approach); Presbyterian Church in the U.S. v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Mem'l Presbyterian
Church, 393 U.S. 440, 449 (1969) (discussing the possibility of "neutral principles of law,
developed for use in all property disputes, which can be applied without 'establishing'
churches to which property is awarded"); Maktab Tarighe Oveyssi Shah Maghsoudi, Inc. v.
Kianfar, 179 F.3d 1244, 1249 (9th Cir. 1999).
The Supreme Court has held that, wholly apart from the hierarchical
decision-making apparatus of the religious organization, a court may resolve
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Supreme Court, this method "relies exclusively on objective, well-established
concepts of... law familiar to lawyers and judges. It thereby promises to free civil
courts completely from entanglement in questions of religious doctrine, polity, and
practice."'1 " Although the Court has not sanctioned this method outside the relatively
limited context of intrachurch property disputes,'1 7 several lower courts have
nevertheless extended its application to assess the adjudicability of otherwise barred
tort actions against religious defendants."'
property disputes by applying secular principles of property, trust and corporate
law when the instruments upon which those principles operate are at hand. Thus
no First Amendment issue arises when a court resolves a church property dispute
by relying on state statutes concerning the holding of religious property, the
language in the relevant deeds, and the terms of corporate charters of religious
organizations.
Id. According to the Court, use of a neutral principles approach is permissible, but not
necessary, in lieu ofwholesale deference to the religious institutional decision. See Jones, 443
U.S. at 604 ("We... hold that a State is constitutionally entitled to adopt neutral principles
of law as a means of adjudicating a church property dispute.").
116. Jones, 443 U.S. at 603; see also South Jersey Catholic Sch. Teachers Org. v. St.
Teresa of the Infant Jesus Church Elem. Sch., 696 A.2d 709, 723 (N.J. 1997) ("'Neutral
principles' are wholly secular legal rules whose application to religious parties does not entail
theological or doctrinal evaluations.").
Under this analysis, courts should focus on "the language ofthe deeds, the terms
of the local church charter, the State statutes governing the holding of church
property, and the provisions in the constitution of the general church concerning
the ownership and control of church property," taking special care to examine
each of these documents in secular terms and not relying on religious precepts
to determine whether the parties intended a particular result
Trustees of Diocese v. Trinity Episcopal Church, 684 N.Y.S.2d 76, 80 (N.Y. App. Div. 1999)
(quoting First Presbyterian Church v. United Presbyterian Church in the U.S., 464 N.E.2d
454, 460-61 (N.Y.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1037 (1984)). For an analysis ofwhat should and
should not be considered "neutral principles," and of how courts have applied the neutral
principles method, see generally Patty Gerstenblith, Civil Court Resolution of Property
Disputes Among Religious Organizations, 39 AM. U. L. REV. 513 (1990); see also William
G. Ross, The Needfor an Exclusive and Uniform Application of "Neutral Principles " in the
Adjudication of Church Property Disputes, 32 ST. Louis U. L.J. 263 (1987).
117. See Hutchison v. Thomas, 789 F.2d 392, 396 (6th Cir. 1986) (noting that "[t]he
'neutral principles' doctrine has never been extended to religious controversies in the areas
of church government, order and discipline"); Klagsbrun v. Va'ad Harabonim of Greater
Monsey, 53 F. Supp. 2d 732, 737-38 (D.N.J. 1999) (discussing, among other cases, Scotts
African Union Methodist Protestant Church v. Conference of African Union First Colored
Methodist Protestant Church, 98 F.3d 78, 91-92 (3d Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1058
(1997), and concluding that "the Third Circuit made clear that the neutral principles
approach, rather than the deference approach, would apply without regard to the type of case
before the court").
118. See, e.g., Martinelli v. Bridgeport Roman Catholic Diocesan Corp., 10 F. Supp. 2d
138, 148 (D. Conn. 1998) (holding that a fiduciary duty claim against a diocese "was capable
of being resolved under Connecticut law using neutral principles and that to do so neither the
Court nor the jury needed to evaluate or weigh ecclesiastical standards based on church
doctrine or inquire into matters of purely ecclesiastical nature to assess the conduct of the
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A second and often accompanying means to avoid the adjudicatory bar is simply
to deem the relevant question or conduct nonreligious, thus by definition placing it
outside of the prohibition. As one court concluded, "[t]ort actions against religious
groups or persons are not offensive to the First Amendment if based on purely secular
activities, unrelated to their religious functions .. . ."I" Or, as summarized by the
Diocese under the circumstances of its knowledge and position"); Smith v. O'Connell, 986
F. Supp. 73, 77-80 (D.R.I. 1997) (applying "neutral principles of law" approach to the tort
context, essentially equating it with the "neutral laws of general application" concept
addressed in Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990)); Isely v. Capuchin Province,
880 F. Supp. 1138, 1151 (E.D. Mich. 1995) (applying neutral principles of law approach to
negligent supervision claim); Moses v. Diocese of Colo., 863 P.2d 310, 320-21 (Colo. 1993)
(en bane) (approving use of neutral principles approach to various tort claims, and similarly
equating it with the "neutral laws of general application" concept of Smith), cert. denied, 511
U.S. 1137 (1994); Mulinix v. Mulinix, No. C2-97-297, 1997 WL 585775, at *6 (Minn. Ct.
App. Sept. 22, 1997) (embracing the neutral principles approach in the tort context though
ultimately declining adjudication); L.L.N. v. Clauder, 563 N.W.2d 434, 440 (Wis. 1997)
(examining "whether the determination of [a] claim for negligent supervision would allow a
court to apply neutral principles of law"). Courts have also applied the neutral principles
approach to suits against religious defendants involving civil rights, see Krebs v. Keating,
Chancery No. 97-118, 1997 WL 1070589, at *3 (Va. Cir. Ct. May 6, 1997), and contract
disputes. See, e.g., Kleppinger v. Anglican Catholic Church, Inc., 715 A.2d 1033,1038 (N.J.
Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1998) ("Neutral principles may be particularly suited for adjudications
of civil contract actions as well.") (citing Welter v. Seton Hall Univ., 608 A.2d 206 (N.J.
1992) ; Elmora Hebrew Ctr., Inc. v. Fishman, 593 A.2d 725 (N.J. 1991); Jewish Ctr. v.
Whale, 432 A.2d 521 (N.J. 1981)).
119. H.R.B. v. J.L.G., 913 S.W.2d 92,98 (Mo. Ct App. 1995); see also Konkle v. Henson,
672 N.E.2d 450, 455 n.6 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996) ("[R]eview only requires the court to determine
if the Church Defendants knew ofHenson's inappropriate conduct, yet failed to protect third
parties from him. The court is simply applying secular standards to secular conduct which is
permissible under First Amendment standards."); C.J.C. v. Corporation of Catholic Bishop,
985 P.2d 262,277 (Wash. 1999) (en banc) ("The FirstAmendment does not provide churches
with absolute immunity to engage in tortious conduct. So long as liability is predicated on
secular conduct and does not involve the interpretation of church doctrine or religious beliefs,
it does not offend constitutional principles."); Martinez v. Primera Asemblea de Dios, Inc.,
No. 05-96-01458-CV, 1998 WL 242412, at*3 (Tex. App. May 15, 1998) ("The Free Exercise
clause has never immunized clergy or churches from all causes of action alleging tortious
conduct. Religious groups may be held liable in tort for secular acts.") (citation omitted). This
distinction is also applied to limit the judicially crafted "ministerial exception" to Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. See Bollard v. California Province of Soc'y of Jesus, No. C
97-3006 SI, 1998 WL 273011, at *3 (N.D. Cal. May 15, 1998) ("Limits to this 'ministerial
exception' to Title VII have been articulated in cases where the plaintiffis a church employee
who performs a secular function, rather than a clergy member performing religious
functions."); Schmoll v. Chapman Univ., 83 Cal. Rptr. 2d 426, 429 n.4 (Cal. Ct. App. 1999)
(stating that "the First Amendment is not implicated when a religious institution makes an
employment decision about an employee whose'duties [do not] go to the heart ofthe church's
function in the manner of a minister or a seminary teacher') (alteration in original) (quoting
EEOC v. Pacific Press Publ'g Ass'n, 676 F.2d 1272,1278 (9th Cir. 1982)). SeegenerallyBell
v. Presbyterian Church (U.S.A.), 126 F.3d 328, 332 (4th Cir. 1997) (discussing and applying
the "primary duties" analysis); EEOC v. Roman Catholic Diocese, 48 F. Supp. 2d 505,509-15
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New York Court of Appeals:
A longstanding principle of First Amendment jurisprudence forbids civil courts
from deciding issues ofreligious doctrine or ecclesiastical polity. This prohibition
does not apply to civil adjudication of purely secular legal questions. Courts can
decide secular legal questions in cases involving some background issues of
religious doctrine, so long as they do not intrude into the determination of the
doctrinal issues.2 0
Needless to say, both this approach and the neutral principles approach involve a
substantial risk that judges will erroneously recategorize matters as nonreligious
simply to subject them to adjudication,' a risk that is magnified by the possibility
that some judges may not even be aware that such recategorization is occurring, let
alone that it poses a serious First Amendment problem. Illustrative is one court's
holding that "if the alleged wrongdoing was clearly outside the tenets of the religion,
notwithstanding its religious pretext, then it is actionable."' Yet to determine
whether conduct is or is not consistent with the tenets of the religion, even at the
extremes, is itself to violate the prohibition againstjudicial interpretation of religious
doctrine.
23
(E.D.N.C. 1999) (discussing generally the ministerial exception and citing the principal
cases); Schmoll, 83 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 429-31 (same).
120. South Jersey Catholic Sch. Teachers Org. v. St. Teresa of Infant Jesus Church
Elementary Sch., 696 A.2d 709, 723 (N.J. 1997).
121. See Ran-Day's County Kosher, Inc. v. State, 608 A.2d 1353, 1363 (N.J. 1992)
(admonishing that "[r]eligious doctrines cannot be recast as secular principles simply because
they are clear" and that "religious doctrings [do not] become neutral simply because they are
widely or even universally held"), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 952 (1993); see also Dean v. Alford,
994 S.W.2d 392, 395 (Tex. App. 1999) (noting the "difficulty... in determining whether a
particular dispute is 'ecclesiastical' or simply a civil law controversy in which church officials
happen to be involved").
122. H.R.B., 913 S.W.2d at 98; see also Smith v. O'Connell, 986 F. Supp. 73, 78 (D.R.I.
1997) (relying on the defendants' interpretation of Catholic doctrine-for example, "they have
made it clear that the Catholic Church considers such conduct to be opprobrious"-tojustify
imposition of a reasonably prudent person standard under tort law); Destefano v. Grabrian,
763 P.2d 275, 284 (Colo. 1988) (en banc) ("When the alleged wrongdoing of a cleric clearly
falls outside the beliefs and doctrine of his religion, he cannot avail himself of the protection
afforded by the first amendment.").
123. See New York v. Cathedral Academy, 434 U.S. 125, 133 (1977) ("The prospect of
church and state litigating in court about what does or does not have religious meaning
touches the very core of the constitutional guarantee against religious establishment, and it
cannot be dismissed by saying it will happen only once.").
The one clear exception to this prohibition, as it relates to measuring the internal
consistency between one's beliefs and one's conduct, is a judge's or a jury's inquiry into a
free exercise claimant's sincerity. See, e.g., Mosier v. Maynard, 937 F.2d 1521, 1523, 1526-
27(10th Cir. 1991) (elaborating on the nature of the sincerity analysis); Philbrook v. Ansonia
Bd. of Educ., 757 F.2d 476,481 (2d Cir. 1985) ("[l]t is entirely appropriate, indeed necessary,
for a court to engage in analysis of the sincerity-as opposed, of course, to the verity-of
someone's religious beliefs in... the free exercise context. . . ."), aff'd, 479 U.S. 60 (1986);
United States v. Lemon, 723 F.2d 922, 938 n.49 (D.C. Cir. 1983) ("Sincerity can be the only
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This second method was recently applied-andin this author's opinion erroneously
so-by a lower New York state court, which ultimately held that a plaintiff could sue
her rabbi for alleged breach of the clergy-penitent privilege.'24 Though noting the
general bar on adjudicating religious questions, 2 ' the court then indicated that
liability or sanctions may be imposed for a religious defendant's conduct if it is
"secular in nature," that is, if "liability is imposed equally, for religious institutions
and parties, as well as for others, and where the basis for such liability may be
determined without examination into religious law or policies.""26 In determining the
nature of the defendant rabbi's conduct, however, the court then took it upon itself
to find (1) that "no member of the clergy... would dare breach the sanctity of his or
her office to make public the type of confidential, private disclosures at issue in this
case"; 27 (2) that the defendant's justification of the conduct "under the guise of
religious necessity, conviction or the protection of the Torah, is not only wrong, it is
outrageous" 28 because "disclosure was not required to prevent [the defendant rabbi]
from violating Jewish law or tradition" 29 and he did not have "a 'religious obligation
as a Rabbi' to make public what had been imparted";30 and (3) that "[p]lainly, there
is no justification, religious or otherwise, for disclosing that plaintiffhad been seeing
men outside the marriage."'' Slightly less plain, of course, is whatjustification this
judge had for declaring as a matter of New York state law the obligations of
Orthodox rabbis to their congregants under Jewish law, especially as a means of
determining that the defendant's conduct was not truly religious or religiously
motivated in nature. Be that as it may, this type of judicial reasoning clearly
illustrates the facility with which judges, when so inclined, can effectively sidestep
or subordinate the First Amendment in the apparent service of other ends.
test, for any inquiry into the truth or falsity of beliefs is barred by the first amendment."). This
position is not uniformly held, however. See, e.g., United States v. Aguilar, 883 F.2d 662, 696
n.33 (9th Cir. 1989) (stating that sincerity of belief is "a standard which is ill-suited for
adjudication" and interpreting United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78 (1944), as "counseling
against entering the 'forbidden domain' of testing the sincerity of religious beliefs" (quoting
Ballard, 322 U.S. at 87)), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1046 (1991); Trinity United Methodist
Parish v. Board of Educ., 907 F. Supp. 707, 718 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (interpreting Ballard as
holding that "[a]nalysis under the Free Exercise Clause does not involve a court in
determining the sincerity of one's religious beliefs .... "); Banks v. Board of Pub. Instruction,
314 F. Supp. 285, 295-96 (S.D. Fla. 1970) (citing Ballard and holding that an inquiry into
whether a plaintiff sincerely holds his religious views "is not a proper consideration for a
court"),fudgment vacated on other grounds, 401 U.S. 988 (1971); Sheldon v. Fannin, 221 F.
Supp. 766, 775 (D. Ariz. 1963) (citing Ballard and holding that "the First Amendment...
guarantees to the plaintiffs the right to claim that their objection to standing is based upon
religious belief, and the sincerity or reasonableness of this claim may not be examined by this
or any other Court").
124. See Lightman v. Flaum, 687 N.Y.S.2d 562 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1999).
125. See id. at 568.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 569.
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A third and alternative method is to concede that the issue or conduct is religious,
but then to find that it is religious only to an inconsequential or minor degree. As the
New Jersey Supreme Court stated in a breach of contract case,
[]ust as the existence of a tangential secular issue does not authorize civil courts
to override primarily doctrinal determinations by authorities in hierarchical
religions, inconsequential doctrinal issues that were irrelevant to the employment
relationship do not preclude doctrinally-objective enforcement of a secular
interest pursuant to a secular agreement.132
Thus, in that case, even though the plaintiffs "may have submitted voluntarily to the
unreviewable discipline" of a religious order, their affiliation with the religious order
"did not amount to a waiver of secular rights to which their status as clerics was
incidental at best."' 13 Of course, judicial determinations of this sort not only pose
potential violations ofthe prohibition oninterpreting religious doctrine-from whose
perspective should the religious aspect of an act or relationship be deemed
minor?-but they also raise the related issue of institutional competence as discussed
in Employment Division v. Smith.1
3 4
Courts have also attempted to avoid the adjudicatory bar by simply devising
categorical exceptions, without regard to the fact that the relevant issue or conduct
may still be religious. These exceptions work by shifting the focus to some aspect of
the issue or conduct that appears to justify adjudication, but in reality serve to obscure
or divert attention from the question of religiousness. At least four such exceptions
can be identified. First, some courts have drawn a line between conduct affecting
132. Welter v. Seton Hall Univ., 608 A.2d 206, 217 (N.J. 1992) (citation omitted). But cf
United Kosher Butcher's Ass'n v. Associated Synagogues of Greater Boston, Inc., 211 N.E.2d
332, 334 (Mass. 1965) ("Phrasing the issue raised... in terms ofwhether the controversy is
'primarily' or 'largely' a religious one can be misleading .... [J]udicial intervention is
determined by the nature of the central issue to be resolved, and not by the incidental or
consequential results of the decision.").
133. Welter, 608 A.2d at 217.
134. 494 U.S. 872, 886-87 & n.4 (1990). On the matter of judicial competence, see also
Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679,729 (1871) ("It is notto be supposed thatthe judges
of the civil courts can be as competent in the ecclesiastical law and religious faith of all these
bodies as the ablest men in each are in reference to their own. It would therefore be an appeal
from the more learned tribunal in the law which should decide the case, to one which is less
so."); Saunders-El v. Tsoulos, I F. Supp. 2d 845, 848 (N.D. Ill. 1998) ("The court notes at
the outset the undesirability ofjudges donning religious robes over judicial ones. The courts
are not equipped to resolve intra-faith differences among followers of a particular creed in
relation to the Religion Clauses."); Presbytery of Beaver-Butler v. Middlesex Presbyterian
Church, 489 A.2d 1317, 1320 (Pa.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 887 (1985).
[T]he right to practice one's belief and worship as one chooses is so deep a root
of our constitutional culture that a court, even one with the best intentions, can
be no more than a clumsy intruder into the most delicate and sensitive areas of
human life. When Caesar enters the Temple to decide whatthe Temple believes,
he can leave behind only his own views. The view of a court as to who are
heretics among warring sects is worth nothing, and must count as nothing if our
cherished diversity of religious views is to prevail.
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persons sufficiently affiliated withthe religious institution and conduct affecting third
parties."' Second and relatedly, some courts have also drawn a line between conduct
that occurs within the spatial bounds or authoritative domain of the religious
institution and conduct that occurs outside of those parameters.136 Third, some courts
135. See, e.g., Paul v. Watchtower Bible & Tract Soc'y, 819 F.2d 875, 883 (9th Cir.)
(distinguishing for purposes ofjudicial scrutiny between church conduct towards members
or former members and church conduct towards nonmembers), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 926
(1987); Konkle v. Henson, 672 N.E.2d 450, 455 n.6 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996) ("[T]he cases
involving the court's power to act in internal church disputes are not applicable to cases
involving harm to third persons. The limits on the court's power are confined to intra-church
disputes.") (citing United Methodist Church v. California Superior Court, 439 U.S. 1369,
1372 (1978) (Rehnquist, C.J.)); Smith v. Calvary Christian Church, 592 N.W.2d 713,718-20
(Mich. CL App. 1998) (surveying the cases distinguishing between suits by church members
and suits by nonmembers); Hadnot v. Shaw, 826 P.2d 978, 988 (Okla. 1992) (holding that
ecclesiastical jurisdiction, and thus bar against civil court scrutiny, does not extend to
nonmembers because "the church has no power over those who live outside of the spiritual
community"); In re Pleasant Glade Assembly of God, 991 S.W.2d 85, 90 (Tex. App. 1998)
(stating in regard to various tort claims that "the First-Amendment defense based on the
free-exercise clause is particularly likely to succeed where, as here, the plaintiffs were or had
been members of the religious group involved"), order stayed on other grounds, No.
2-98-222-CV, 1999 WL 13249 (Tex. App. Jan. 13, 1999); cf. Laycock, supra note 14, at
1403-09 (discussing the potential distinction in church autonomy cases between internal and
external relations). Consider in this regard the Colorado Supreme Court's analysis in Bear
Valley Church of Christ v. DeBose, 928 P.2d 1315 (Colo. 1996) (en banc), cert. denied, 520
U.S. 1241 (1997), and cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1248 (1997). Responding to a church's
argument that the First Amendment precluded tort claims against it for negligent hiring,
supervising, disciplining, and discharging a minister, the Court stated:
In Van Osdol v. Vogt, 908 P.2d 1122, 1128 (Colo. 1996), we held that "[t]he
decision to hire or discharge a minister is itself inextricable from religious
doctrine." However, we took care to distinguish internal hiring disputes within
religious organizations from general negligence claims filed by injured third
parties: "[T]he court... looks to whether the specific danger which ultimately
manifested itself could have reasonably been foreseen at the time ofhiring. This
inquiry, even when applied to a minister employee, is so limited and factually
based that it can be accomplished with no inquiry into religious beliefs." As we
noted in Van Osdol, courts may review an injured third party's claim that a
religious institution negligently hired, supervised, or failed to discharge one of
its employees without implicating or running afoul of the First Amendment.
1d. at 1323-24 (alterationin original) (selected citations omitted) (quoting Van Osdol v. Vogt,
908 P.2d 1122, 1128, 1132 n.17 (Colo. 1996)).
136. See, e.g., Hayden v. Schulte, 701 So. 2d 1354, 1356 (La. Ct. App. 1997) (finding
subject matter jurisdiction over a defamation action against a church, in part because the
plaintiff claimed that the allegedly defamatory statements were "intentionally disseminated
outside the church to news organizations"), writ denied, 709 So. 2d 737 (La. 1998); see also
McNair v. Worldwide Church of God, 242 Cal. Rptr. 823, 833 (Cal. Ct. App. 1987) (deeming
it a "crucial fact" that the defendant's allegedly defamatoryremarks "were made while he was
explaining Church doctrine" at a pastoral conference and in a pastor's report); First United
Church v. Udofia, 479 S.E.2d 146,148-49 (Ga. CL App. 1996) (acknowledging that normally
"the civil courts will not inquire into or determine the validity of the expulsion of a member
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appear to consider the prohibition inapplicable in cases alleging intentional tortious
conduct.13 7 Finally, courts likewise appear to consider the prohibition inapplicable
where the otherwise inadjudicable conduct allegedly involves fraud. 38
from a church having a congregational form of government" but concluding that "here the
statements about the plaintiffs were not done in the course of an investigation of their church
membership, and plaintiffs do not seek civil court relief in the form of return to membership,
which would be outside the court's competence"); Murphy v. I.S.K.Con. of New Eng., Inc.,
571 N.E.2d 340, 349 n. Il (Mass.) (disallowing tort claim in part because the religious
doctrines related to the allegedly tortious conduct "were taught to [the plaintiff] at regularly
scheduled temple meetings"), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 865 (1991); Schoenhals v. Mains, 504
N.W.2d 233, 236 (Minn. Ct. App. 1993) ("[T]he fact that the [allegedly defamatory] letter
was disseminated only to other members of the Church strengthens the conclusion that [the
defendant's] statements involved and were limited to Church discipline. The [plaintiffs']
claim clearly involves an internal conflict within the Church, which is precluded by the First
Amendment."); Howard v. Covenant Apostolic Church, Inc., 705 N.E.2d 385, 388-89 (Ohio
Ct. App. 1997) (rejecting defamation claim because the alleged defamatory remarks "took
place during the meeting that was held to determine whether he should be disfellowed from
the Church, were made to or bythose involved in initiating the disfellowship proceedings, and
concerned issues ofappellant's morality"), appealnotallowed, 688 N.E.2d 1043 (Ohio 1998).
137. See, e.g., Gibson v. Brewer, 952 S.W.2d 239, 248 (Mo. 1997) (en bane) (rejecting a
claim of negligent supervision but holding that "[r]ecognizing the tort of intentional failure
to supervise clergy, in contrast, does not offend the FirstAmendment"); Hesterv. Barnett, 723
S.W.2d 544, 552 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987) (stating that "[t]he intentional torts of a cleric are
• .. actionable, . . . even though incidents of religious practice and belief'); F.G. v.
MacDonell, 696 A.2d 697, 702 (N.J. 1997) (noting that "courts have recognized claims for
intentional torts against clergymen" and citing cases); see also Korean Presbyterian Church
of Seattle Normalization Comm. v. Lee, 880 P.2d 565, 569 & n.6 (Wash. Ct. App. 1994)
(noting that some courts "suggest that no intentional torts should enjoy religious protection"
and holding, in regard to the tort of outrage for a church's disclosure of plaintiffs'
excommunication, that "[w]here a plaintiff can establish that the defendant acted with actual
malice, such malice negates any claim thatthe actionwas undertaken forreligious purposes").
The Lee court, however, further stated that "[w]hatever the definition of actual malice is, it
cannot entail an analysis of whether a hierarchical church violated its own laws and
procedures; such an analysis is otherwise prohibited by the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine."
Id. at 570.
138. See, e.g., Fire Baptized Holiness Church of God of the Americas v. Greater Fuller
Tabernacle Fire Baptized Holiness Church, 475 S.E.2d 767, 770 (S.C. Ct. App. 1996) (per
curiam) ("Absent fraud or collusion, the decisions of the proper church tribunals on matters
purely ecclesiastical, although affecting civil rights, are accepted in litigation before the
secular courts as conclusive because the parties in interest made them so by contract or
otherwise."); Libhart v. Copeland, 949 S.W.2d 783, 794 (Tex. App. 1997) ("[G]enerally the
court should not intervene in church disputes. However, when church proceedings are tainted
by fraud, judicial review is appropriate.") (citations omitted). See generally Serbian E.
Orthodox Diocese v. Milivoj evich, 426 U.S. 696, 713 (1976) (discussing significance offraud
or collusion, though rejecting exception for alleged arbitrariness); cf Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S.
595, 609 n.8 (1979) (reaffirming fraud-collusion principle of Milivojevich). For a seemingly
strong contrary position, see Tilton v. Marshall, 925 S.W.2d 672, 678 (Tex. 1996).
[N]o claim of fraud may be made if it rests on a representation of religious
doctrine or belief-even if insincerely made. For example, most courts would
probably hold that a claim of fraud is not actionable if based upon the
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Although other exceptions no doubt exist,"39 the above listing sufficiently
demonstrates thevulnerability ofthe prohibitionto judicial avoidance and, thus, gives
some indication of how it might be sidestepped or eroded on a more widescale basis
in the future. Whether such erosion need occur-and specifically what counterforces
might prevent or minimize it-will provide the focus of the next and final Part of the
Article.
IV. THE PREVENTION OF ITS DEMISE
The developments described in Parts II and III, though significant, do not render
inevitable the demise of either the general prohibition on adjudicating religious
questions or the specific bar on certain tort suits against religious entities. Not yet
addressed are other factors that could cause or signal the retention, even the
strengthening, of the prohibition, as well as additional measures that could be
undertaken to forestall its demise. This final Part of the Article shall briefly address
these considerations.
First of all, there has emerged over the last several years a multitude of aggressive
religious litigation firms or institutions, several of which operate within relatively
sophisticated regional or national networks. 14 0 Although there is no strong indication
representation that, in exchange for a monetary contribution, God will cure a
sick donor's illness. As long as the representation forming the basis of the fraud
claim is a religious doctrine or belief, it is constitutionally protected from
judicial inquiry.
Id. (citations omitted). "[B]ecause the truth or falsity of a religious representation is beyond
the scope of judicial inquiry, the sincerity of the person making such a representation is
irrelevant when the religious representation forms the basis of a fraud claim. Whether the
statement of religious doctrine or belief is made honestly or in bad faith is of no moment,
because falsity cannot be proved." Id. at 679.
139. One court, for example, has held that it is not improper to recognize foreign court
judgments even if they stem from an adjudication that domestically would be impermissible
under the general prohibition. See Imuta v. Nakano, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d 78, 86 (Cal. Ct. App.
1996) (unpublished opinion) ("We do not understandMilivojevich as disenfranchising a civil
court from ignoring an act of an ecclesiastical judicatory where another court-particularly
a foreign court not shown to have lacked jurisdiction to decide the matter-has rendered a
final decision determining that act to be invalid.").
140. See Mark G. Valencia, Comment, Take Care ofMe When 1Am Dead: An Examination
of American Church-State Development and the Future ofAmerican Religious Liberty, 49
SMU L. REv. 1579, 1628-29 (1996) (discussing "the emergence of law firms that specialize
in religious liberty litigation"); see generally James H. Andrews, Religious Right Fights,
CmusTrLA Sci. MoNrroR, Feb. 7, 1994, at 14 (discussing the American Center for Law and
Justice ("ACLJ"), the Christian Legal Society ("CLS"), and the Rutherford Institute);
Elizabeth Gleick, Onward Christian Lawyers, TIME, Mar. 13, 1995, at 57 (discussing the
ACLJ and the Regent University School of Law); Julia McCord, DefendingReligious Rights,
OMAHA WORJ-HERALD, Apr. 29, 1995, available in 1995 WL 4071414 (discussing the
ACLJ, the Rutherford Institute, the CLS, the American Family Association Law Center, and
the Alliance Defense Fund); Roger K. Newman, Suits with Agendas, NAT'L L.J., Aug. 26,
1996, atAl (discussing generally the rise of conservative public interest litigation groups and
specifically the ACLJ and the CLS); Larry Witham, Activists Defend Religious Liberty,
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that defending tort suits against religious entities is a significant component of their
efforts to date, nevertheless one can find some evidence of their participation in such
suits. "' More significantly, they are well-situated to undertake a more active role in
the future and, as courts increasingly divide over issues of adjudicability and religious
entities are increasingly exposed to liability, they may very well do so.
Additionally, although a number of courts presently appear willing (or even eager)
to extend and apply their states' tort law to religious tortfeasors that engage in
otherwise actionable and sometimes outrageous conduct, at some point many of these
courts probably would be willing to acknowledge the serious problems of doctrinal
entanglement, among others, inherent in such adjudication. Even if they are not
willing at first, they may become so once they are asked to formulate a standard of
clergy conduct, for example, or to declare that a particular interpretation and
application of scripture is legally unreasonable. As one federal district judge
remarked:
It may be argued that it requires no excessive entanglement with religion to
decide that reasonably prudent clergy of any sect do not molest children. The
difficulty is that this Court... must consider not only this case, but the next case
to follow, and the ones after that, before we embrace the newly invented tort of
clergy malpractice. This places us clearly on the slippery slope .... 142
In turn, perhaps through the educative experience of litigation, what presently
appears to be a judicial trajectory towards adjudicability could soften into a
realization that the prohibition on adjudicating certain claims may reflect a deeper,
sounder understanding of the nature and status of religion and the limits of the law
within the American constitutional scheme. It is true that legal momentum does not
often suddenly or easily change course, just as the judicial office does not often
gracefully concede error, but even judges can succumb to the persuasive force of
reality.
43
WASH. TnWns, July 6, 1995, atA2 (discussing the Becket Fund for Religious Liberty).
141. See, e.g., Klagsbrun v. Va'ad Harabonim of Greater Monsey, 53 F. Supp. 2d 732, 733
(D.N.J. 1999) (listing Marc D. Stem, general counsel for the American Jewish Congress, as
defendants' counsel ofrecord); Hayden v. Schulte, 701 So. 2d 1354,1355 (La. Ct. App. 1997)
(listing William Bentley Ball as co-counsel for defendants-appellees), writ denied, 709 So.
2d 737 (La. 1998); Gibson v. Brewer, 952 S.W.2d 239, 243 (Mo. 1997) (en banc) (listing
Professor Carl Esbeck and the CLS's Center for Law & Religious Freedom as amici); Byrd
v. Faber, 565 N.E.2d 584, 586 (Ohio 1991) (listing the Baptist Joint Committee on Public
Affairs, the American Jewish Congress, the CLS, the National Association of Evangelicals,
and the National Council of Churches of Christ in the U.S.A_ as amici).
142. Schmidt v. Bishop, 779 F. Supp. 321, 328 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).
143. Cf. Moldea v. New York Times Co., 22 F.3d 310,311 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (withdrawing
an earlier opinion and candidly acknowledging that it rested on "a mistake ofjudgment").
Once discovered, confessing error is relatively easy. What is difficult is
accepting the realization that, despite your best efforts, you may still fall prey to
an error ofjudgment .... I will take refuge in an aphorism of Justice Frankfurter
"Wisdom too often never comes, and so one ought not to reject it merely because
it comes late."
Id. (quoting Henslee v. Union Planters Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 335 U.S. 595, 600 (1949)
[Vol. 75:219
DECLINE OF CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTION
The fate of the bar on adjudicating tort actions against religious entities may also
partly rest in the hands of the religious entities themselves, and their conduct in
addressing church and clergy wrongdoing may greatly influence the course of legal
evolution on this matter. At some level, the judicial willingness to hear such claims
may largely reflect the perceived inaction or recalcitrance of religious institutions in
regard to a problem otherwise within their exclusive control. To the extent, therefore,
that these institutions become more responsive in the first instance to allegations of
misconduct, while concomitantly working to prevent and address actual misconduct,
courts may perceive a diminished necessity to impose the deterrence and
compensation mechanisms of tort law on these institutions.44
Finally, there is always a chance that the Supreme Court could, in a cavalry-like
fashion, enter the field and hold that the adjudication of various tort claims against
religious entities, with some exceptions, does in fact violate the First Amendment.
Reliance on this prospect should not be the strategy of choice, however. For one
thing, the Court has steadfastly refused over the last several years to address the
adjudicability of religious issues,145 despite ample opportunity to do so 146 and despite
(Frankfurter, J., dissenting)).
144. See generally TomHeinen,Archdiocese Set ToRequire CriminalBackground Checks,
MILW. J.-SENTINEL, July 16, 1999, at B1, 5 (describing the Milwaukee Archdiocese's new
policy of checking backgrounds of volunteers working with youth and how such policies are
becoming more common, and reporting one commentator's sense that "[c]hurch-related
allegations of sexual abuse involving children and adult victims have stabilized in the past
four years" due, in his opinion, to "lawsuits, growing public awareness, and more education
of church officials"); Smith, supra note 66, at 418-20 (noting potential advantages to churches
for reporting clergy sexual abuse of children, including possible immunity of church officials
against criminal or civil liability, a possible reduction in future civil liability, and a preclusion
of claims for alleged criminal or negligent failure to report where a duty to do so exists under
state law).
145. See Nathan Clay Belzer, Deference in the JudicialResolution oflntrachurch Disputes:
The Lesser of Two Constitutional Evils, 11 ST. THoMAs L. REv. 109, 112 (1998) (observing
that "the Supreme Court has not addressed th[e] issue [of adjudicating intrachurch disputes]
since the Wolfdecision in 1979" and that "[s]tate courts, therefore, have been the final arbiter
of intrachurch dispute resolution during the course of the last eighteen years").
146. A survey ofthe Court's most recent terms suffices to illustrate its consistent avoidance
of such cases. See, e.g., Fundamentalist Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints v.
Bradshaw, 119 S. Ct. 1803 (1999), denying cert. to 970 P.2d 1234 (Utah 1998); Hengle v.
Ward, 119 S. Ct 183 (1998), denying cert. to 706 N.E.2d 392 (Ohio Ct. App. 1997); Baucum
v. Sanders, 119 S. Ct. 161 (1998), denying cert. to 134 F.3d 331 (5th Cir. 1998); Weaver v.
Wood, 522 U.S. 1049 (1998), denying cert. to 134 F.3d 331 (5th Cir. 1998); Roman Catholic
Diocese of Brooklyn v. KennethR., 522 U.S. 967 (1997), denying cert. to 654 N.Y.S.2d 791
(N.Y. App. Div. 1997); Grand Fraternity Rosae Crueis v. Moyer, 118 S. Ct. 297 (1997),
denying cert. to 114 F.3d 1172 (3d Cir. 1997); Zimmer v. Naumann, 522 U.S. 820 (1997),
denying cert. to 1997 WL 10520 (Minn. Ct. App. June 16, 1997); Bear Valley Church of
Christ v. DeBose, 520 U.S. 1248 (1997), denying cert. to 928 P.2d 1315 (Colo. 1996); Wolfe
v. DeBose, 520 U.S. 1241 (1997), denying cert. to 890 P.2d 214 (Colo. 1995); Croation
Roman Catholic Congregation of Holy Trinity Church v. Wuerl, 519 U.S. 1114 (1997),
denying cert. to 668 A.2d 1151 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1995), appeal denied, 683 A.2d 884 (Pa.
1996); Rocky Mtn. Conf. of United Methodist Church v. Winkler, 519 U.S. 1093 (1997),
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the warrant for such review in the stark division of state and federal courts over
important constitutional question. 4 7 For another thing, the Supreme Court could
very well hold that the general rule be one in favor of adjudicability and that any
exceptions, such as for genuine religious questions or formal ecclesiastical decisions,
be relatively limited. After all, the Free Exercise Clause is no longer the wellspring
of heightened scrutiny that it once appeared to be, and as noted earlier the Court's
neutrality-as-equality interpretation of both clauses does not, at first blush, seem to
favor the differential treatment of tort actions against religious defendants merely
because their adjudication may implicate religious questions. That said, it
nevertheless remains true that the Court could, in one or two opinions, essentially
resolve the matter against adjudicability and thereby retard or reverse any movement
to the contrary.
denying cert. to 923 P.2d 152 (Colo. Ct. App. 1995); Conference of African Union First
Colored Methodist Protestant Church v. Scotts African Union Methodist Protestant Church,
519 U.S. 1058 (1997), denying cert. to 541 N.W.2d 606 (Minn. Ct. App. 1996); African
Union Methodist Protestant Church & Connection v. Mother African Union First Colored
Methodist Protestant Church, 519 U.S. 1042 (1996), denying cert. to 683 A.2d 58 (Del.
1996); Singleton v. Christ the Servant Evangelical Lutheran Church, 519 U.S. 870 (1996),
denying cert. to 541 N.W.2d 606 (Minn. Ct. App. 1996); Church of Lord Jesus Christ of
Apostolic Faith v. Shelton, 519 U.S. 869 (1996), denying cert. to 673 A.2d 398 (Pa. Super
Ct. 1995), appeal denied, 675 A.2d 1241 (Pa. 1996); Basich v. Evangelical Lutheran Church
in Am. Bd. of Pensions, 519 U.S. 810 (1996), denying cert. to 540 N.W.2d 25 (Iowa 1995);
Pierce v. Iowa-Mo. Conf. of Seventh Day Adventists, 517 U.S. 1220 (1996), denying cert. to
534 N.W.2d 425 (Iowa 1995); Green v. United Pentecostal Church Int'l, 517 U.S. 1134
(1996), denying cert. to 899 S.W.2d 28 (Tex. Ct. App. 1995); Brach v. Congregation Yetev
Lev D'Satmar, Inc., 516 U.S. 1173 (1996), denying cert. to 57 F.3d 1064 (2d Cir. 1995);
Pritzlaff v. Archdiocese of Milwaukee, 516 U.S. 1116 (1996), denying cert. to 533 N.W.2d
780 (Wis. 1995); McKown v. Lundman, 516 U.S. 1099 (1996), denying cert. to 530 N.W.2d
807 (Minn. Ct. App. 1995); Lundman v. First Church of Christ, Scientist, 516 U.S. 1092
(1996), denying cert. to 530 N.W.2d 807 (Minn. Ct. App. 1995); Geraci v. Eckankar, 516
U.S. 818 (1996), denying cert. to 526 N.W.2d 391 (Minn. Ct. App. 1995); Bussey v. Owens,
515 U.S. 1131 (1995), denying cert. to [unpublished decision] (D.C. Dec. 15, 1994); Primate
& Bishops' Synod of the Russian Orthodox Church v. Russian Orthodox Church of the Holy
Resurrection, Inc., 513 U.S. 1121 (1995), denying cert. to 636 N.E.2d 211 (Mass. 1994);
American Union of Baptists, Inc. v. Trustees of Particular Primitive Baptist Church at Black
Rock, Inc., 513 U.S. 1111 (1995), denying cert. to 644 A.2d 1063 (Md. Ct. App. 1994);
Ricchio v. Poesnecker, 513 U.S. 1079 (1995), denying cert. to 631 A.2d 1097 (Pa. Connw.
Ct. 1993), appeal denied, 647 A.2d 906 (Pa. 1994); Young v. Northern Ill. Conf. of United
Methodist Church, 513 U.S. 929 (1994), denying cert. to 21 F.2d 184 (7th Cir. 1994).
147. See SUP. CT. R. 10(a)-(c) (enumerating considerations governing the grant of
certiorari, especially splits between federal courts and state courts over important federal
questions); Braxton v. United States, 500 U.S. 344, 347 (1991) ("[A] principal purpose for
which we use our certiorari jurisdiction... is to resolve conflicts among the United States
courts of appeals and state courts concerning the meaning of provisions of federal law.").
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CONCLUSION
The general rule of not adjudicating tort claims against religious defendants is
presently at a cultural and doctrinal crossroads. Whether courts will continue to
observe this prohibition, or whether they will precipitate its demise, is by no means
a simple inquiry, and the answer cannot depend on just one or two considerations.
The development of any legal rule is seldom truly linear and virtually never
unifactorial, the prediction of which, accordingly, is often little more than an exercise
in speculation. Nevertheless, when several relevant considerations together indicate
that the rule in question may be under tremendous strain and that it may not possess
the stability or integrity to withstand that strain, one may legitimately predict that the
doctrine will, in fact, be gradually eroded.
This Article, taking account of various cultural, institutional, and doctrinal
considerations, has argued that such erosion is likely, if not very likely. At the same
time, it has recognized the existence of other factors that may actually retard or even
forestall a movement away from the general rule of nonadjudicability that presently
prevails. Of course, should this erosion occur, it will almost certainly occur
incrementally, by means ofjudicially devised exceptions such as those documented
earlier, rather than by wholesale and immediate repudiation. Just as the contemporary
constitutional bar on adjudicating religious questions took several decades, even
centuries, to develop, so its demise in the tort context, if it is to occur at all, will
likely unfold one jurisdiction and one case at a time.
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